THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

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Vol. XXX APRIL, 1935 No. 178

EDITORIAL

We have, as the Ordinal says, good hope that clerical readers will have well weighed and pondered with themselves long before this time the things that were written about Holy Week in the March number of this Journal. It may be that it was not found possible in all or even most parish churches to introduce all or even most of the liturgical practices recommended by the writer. But much will have been done if arrangements are on foot to make the accustomed services and ceremonies of Holy Week more solemn and more dignified. So far as Good Friday is concerned, the liturgical observance of the Three Hours seems to be growing slowly but surely. Not every church can provide it. But where there are the Reproaches, Litany, Ante-Communion, with the Holy Gospel sung solemnly and a sermon of substantial dimensions, and then a fairly long interval of silence, and then Evensong, it is a rite which is manifestly for the glory of God, and it makes an impression on the mind of a congregation which is not soon forgotten. Sometimes a part only is attempted—*e.g.*, we have just heard of a church where the framework of the Three Hours Service is the Ante-Communion, and the meditations on the Seven Words are made to fill the place of the appointed sermon.

May we here offer a word of counsel to those who preach on Good Friday? It is this: Do not be afraid of the emotions. In a book now forgotten, which was published under the title of *A Parson's Defence* in 1912, the author said: "If we are going, as I hope we are, to preach Jesus only, we must have theology to save us from being crude. Some of us have to be as crude as we can bear to be. We are driven to employ large print and broad effects, as lecturers are driven to use words and diagrams. But we do want to be saved from the crudity of some books that might be named and some phrases that might be quoted. Theology is the only thing that will save us, and

with our theology at our back we can safely let ourselves go. . . . An English parson who has had some education in theology, who has the decent, reverent instincts of a gentleman, can afford to let himself go without danger." After all, Good Friday is the one day in the year when the supreme appeal must be brought to bear deliberately and in the whole of its compelling majesty. The appeal lies to the conscience and the will, but the door thither is often through the emotions. Now, if ever, is the time to reach the faculties whose co-operation is essential through any door which may be open. On Good Friday the appeal is not general, or incidental, or allusive. It is a direct frontal attack on sin and indecision.

The general thought of the Cross is perpetually present in all Christian worship. Every Eucharist embodies it; every collect alludes to it. But the collect-ending is only a passing reminder. Even the Eucharist, by virtue of its very permanence, just because it does lift us into the eternal religion, is less vivid, as a sheer reminder of the Cross, than Good Friday preaching at its best can be. The Eucharist is a confident pleading ("boldness and access," Eph. iii. 12), with all the security of the Ascension and the heavenly Priesthood behind it, of the One Sacrifice Once Made. Having been quickened together with Him, and raised with Him, and made to sit with Him in the heavenlies, we not only hold communion with Christ, our Head, as He is now at the right hand of God, but we recover through His Priesthood and our re-presentation of the Passion some contact with Him Crucified. Nevertheless the dominant thought at the altar is relationship with the risen and ascended Christ, the Christ of the Epistles or of the Apocalypse. Of course the Sacrament looks back to Calvary, without which it would have no existence, just as the Upper Room looked forward to Calvary. As Père de la Taille puts it: "The Mass is a sacrifice, because it is the oblation of the Victim once immolated, even as the Supper was the oblation of the Victim to be immolated." The Good Friday sermon rests on the same continuity of the divine acts. There would be no Good Friday, and no pulpit, and no preacher, if the first Good Friday had been the last day of our Lord's life. The sermon is only possible, grace only exists, because Christ is risen and ascended. But the permanence here is only the background, precious and essential, but not present to the mind all the time, as it is at the altar. The immediate purpose is to recapture the actual scene of Calvary and to perceive its meaning. The Holy Eucharist has its necessary *anamnesis*, and indeed, theologically speaking, depends

utterly on the Cross, Easter, the Ascension and Pentecost, but the Good Friday sermon goes back to "Father, forgive them"; "Why hast thou forsaken me?" and "I thirst." Almost it is χριστὸς προγράφεται, not ἐσταυρωμένος, as St. Paul says to the Galatians, but σταυρούμενος. This must surely make its mark on the emotions. And if they be regarded as the gateway to the conscience and the will, no harm will be done.

May we add one more suggestion? It is about silence. It is an indispensable element of all worship, and above all of meditation. Eloquent preachers conducting the Three Hours Devotion are sometimes cruel to their hearers. They preach, or pray aloud, incessantly. The hearers are no doubt at different stages of devotional ripeness and capacity. It is not easy to give enough time for some without over-tasking others. It may be that an average will have to be conjectured. But when no time is given at all, a priceless opportunity is thrown away.

Meantime, this number of THEOLOGY will appear about Mid-Lent. It is the time when resolutions are likely to have suffered some attrition, and the final stimulus is yet to come. We remember to have been present in a room some thirty years ago when Mr. Chesterton was suddenly asked: "What is the difference between Catholic fasting and the Puritan avoidance of cards, theatres and such things?" Without a moment's hesitation he replied: "The Puritan mixes it up with morals; he thinks it wrong to go to the theatre, as it would be wrong to kill your grandmother. The Catholic, on the other hand, contemplates some entirely honest and therefore entirely holy thing, like a beefsteak or a theatre, and says that for the time being he will forgo this innocent way of spending time and money and giving himself pleasure. He does this partly as mere Church discipline, but partly also in order that he may devote himself to that which was there before his body was created and will still be there when his body has crumbled into dust." Form-criticism would perhaps detect a certain manipulation of the original material, due, as the form-critics say, to the habit of preaching sermons, but the first sentence and the beef-steak are authentic recollections of *ipsissima verba*.

A correspondent has questioned the remark of Mr. W. Norman Pittenger (of the General Theological Seminary, New York City) in our February number (p. 86) that the historical value of the Fourth Gospel is practically *nil*. He asks whether the

scholarly reasoning of Lightfoot, Westcott and Plummer is to be considered as completely out of date. We mentally noted the statement at the time as temerarious, but, inasmuch as it appeared over the name of its author, made no comment. We expect that Mr. Pittenger meant that the Fourth Gospel was not to be used *simpliciter*—*i.e.*,"We have it on the authority of St. John that," etc. In point of fact, the historical accuracy of the Gospel has been reaffirmed of late in several quarters. Jewish scholars, for example, have paid tribute to the correctness of its local colour in not a few respects. But the Gospel remains an interpretation rather than an historical record. Perhaps the best way of using it as an historical authority is the way in which the Bishop of Lincoln, in *The Fulness of Sacrifice*, treats crucial passages (*e.g.*, Mark x. 45) which have been "weightily challenged on doctrinal grounds." His method is not to use them "on a first survey of the material. It is only if, and when, such a first survey may seem to justify their doctrine that they may be taken into account." The actual value of the Fourth Gospel could hardly be better put than it is by Mr. H. G. Wood in *Christianity and the Nature of History* (Cambridge, 1935, 6*s*., page xxxiv): "I was in some danger of being preoccupied with Jesus as a figure of history and so of failing to hear the Lord Himself say, 'Arise, let us go hence.' I was a Marcan rather than a Johannine Christian. And while the Synoptic portraits of Jesus mean not less but rather more than before, and while they continue to be, in Glover's phrase, 'anchors in the actual,' which check misdirected flights of mystical fancy that claim to represent the eternal Christ, yet the fourth evangelist's interpretation of the Christ eternal and his doctrine of the Paraclete, the spirit of truth, seem to me now the charter of Christian liberty and progress."

Readers may be interested to learn that Bishop Grandisson's fourteenth-century *Exon. Ordinale* records that over the stalls of the four "dignitaries" in Exeter Cathedral were placed the following Leonine verses:

Dean—Tardius atque mane Residens rege cuncta, decane.
Precentor—Hic residens chorum Rege, cantor, dux puerorum.
Chancellor—Hac qui sede sedes, Jura sacrata leges.
Treasurer—Tresauros conde Residens pro lumine sponde.

The Anglican Fellowship will hold its Annual Conference at St. Hilda's College, Oxford, from July 15 to July 19. The subject is "The Holy Communion in the Thought and Life of

the Church." Among those who have promised to take part are Dr. Mozley, Dr. Tait, Dr. Kirk, Canon Lilley, the Rev. R. O. P. Taylor, the Rev. H. L. Hubbard, and the Chairman, who is the Editor of this Journal. The Conference is a Conference, not a Retreat, though it has its strong devotional side. It also has its friendly social side. Information about membership, or the terms on which a few visitors are invited, may be had from Miss C. Gregory, Mary Monk's Close, Whitchurch, Aylesbury.

We hope it is not an indiscretion to say that the Secretary of the Anglican Fellowship has in her possession a small piece of paper, which has been folded into a triangle and bears the remains of sealing-wax. It is addressed to R. Gregory, Esq., C.C.C. Within it contains the words "Oriel. Sunday Morning. My dear Sir, I shall be happy to receive you to Communion at St. Mary's this morning. Yours very truly, John H. Newman." It is evident that a rubrically-minded undergraduate, who was afterwards Dean of St. Paul's, had "signified his intention to the Curate at least some time the day before." There is no date, but it must have been towards the end of his vicariate. Let us hope that it cheered Newman, who in July, 1834, had written: "After many months' deliberation I have taken advantage of the Long Vacation [when the College Chapel is closed] to begin daily morning service at St. Mary's; how it will succeed is still to be seen . . . the whole question of the Rubrics is a melancholy one. Things are so bad that one keeps silence" (*Letters and Correspondence*, ii. 54). During the same month he had written: "Declined marrying a couple, the lady being unbaptized. No one, apparently, to encourage me, and so many black averted faces, that unless from my youth I had been schooled to fall back upon myself, I should have been quite out of heart."

RELIGION AND YOUTH*

FROM what point of view are we to try to lead the rising generation to think of religion? To what point of their thought, as it were, is the main appeal of our religious instruction to be directed? By what door in their minds does religion most appropriately and effectively come in? This is the question to which in the main I want to direct our attention in this paper. It is evident that the answer to it must be determined by two principal considerations: (*a*) the consideration of the nature of the minds into which entry is to be effected, and (*b*) the consideration of what it is that we think ought to enter. I propose to begin with a few remarks upon the first of these considerations, and then, with those remarks in mind, to proceed to deal at rather more length with the second. I am fully aware that in so doing I shall be in grave danger of raising a general discussion upon the whole meaning and truth of religion. But I hope at least to be able to confine attention to certain broad aspects of that all-embracing and all-absorbing topic which are of really vital relevance to the particular task of teaching we have in hand.

In the first place I will begin by boldly laying it down before an audience which is better qualified than any other to correct me if I am wrong, that a special characteristic of later adolescence and the first few years of adult manhood is the emergence and prominence of the strictly intellectual interest, the passion for intellectual enquiry and criticism, and the zeal for attaining precisely formulated truth about the world and the things that are therein. It seems to me that in this respect the golden age of scholasticism truly represents the adolescence of European philosophy. Our modern philosophies and theologies, which tend more and more to regard the intellectual quest of truth and its precise formulation as at best an academic pastime, and are interested in theories only in so far as in one way or another they are found to deliver practical and social goods—these are philosophies characteristic of middle age, and not of the Middle Ages. Middle age has outgrown the theoretic attitude of youth. It knows the value of time and the shortness of its own span; and it is anxious to improve things a bit, or rather to set things in the way to be improved, and to make some provision for the future, before it departs. The haste of youth is not practical:

* A Paper read at the Conference of Schoolmasters and College Tutors at Cambridge in January, 1935.

it is impatience at the discrepancy between the theoretic ideals which it loves and the sordid actualities which it is apt to despise. But the wisdom of middle age, even in planning revolution, is eminently practical. And the conspicuous dominance of practice over theory in modern thought displays the mind of a civilization which is well aware that it has already passed its prime, and seeks to lay securely some foundations for the new world which is to be, before the quickly approaching dissolution overtakes it. No doubt the middle-aged philosophies of our epoch may and do affect the rising generation almost more than that whose youth was passed in days of apparently greater security. I am often told by those who are in constant contact with older schoolboys and undergraduates that the old theoretic subjects of discussion are losing their appeal, that even the opposition between religion and science now interests only the senior clergy as a subject of debate, that what the young demand from their religious teachers is the exposition of Christianity, not as a system of doctrine which is either true or false, but as a practical way of living which by shewing results can give them clear guidance in conduct. No doubt this demand exists, and must be reckoned with and sympathetically met. But I cannot readily agree with those who seem to think that we should scrap doctrinal and philosophical theology altogether in order to present Christianity as a more efficient means of life-changing and reconstruction than the rival social gospels which compete with it. I still believe, *meo maximo periculo*, that the theoretic interest is native to youth, however much at the moment it may be obscured or overlaid by the practical anxieties which the circumstances of the time have thrust upon us all. And if we are too eager to follow only popular demand, we may find that we are really helping youth to deprive itself of its proper birthright, which, once bartered for the mess of more immediately satisfying pottage, can never be recovered in later life. Let us not suffer the total eclipse of "the high white star of truth" about which that incurable Peter Pan, Matthew Arnold, waxed so sentimental when he was quite old enough to have learned better. The time is fast coming when religious orthodoxy, and not any science or philosophy, will be the only teacher left to bid us "there gaze and there aspire."

"But religion," I shall be doubtless reminded at this point, "is so much more than doctrine. To present it mainly as a credal system is to present it dead." That is true enough. But let us at least be careful that when we say that religion is much more than doctrine we really mean "much more" and not "much less." The fact is that genuine religion touches

human life and personality at every point; and therein lies the difference between religious belief and political or scientific or metaphysical theory. Religion is not just "a view" however strongly or sincerely held. It is that by which a man or a society lives, that which determines the whole aim of living, the scale of values and the standard of judgment. In one sense, therefore, it is true that every individual and every society must have a religion, though the religion by which it really lives may be something very different from the doctrines or beliefs about God which it outwardly professes, even when the profession is not consciously insincere. A professing materialist, for instance, may be guiding his life according to highly spiritual standards of duty and honour. And in that case he may be said to have a genuine religion which, whatever it may be, is certainly not materialism. And equally a professing Christian, without conscious insincerity in his affirmation of his creed, may in fact be doing little more than take the easy course of conforming his views and conduct to the conventional standards of the society he lives in, in which case his real religion can hardly be said to be Christianity. But what is the right inference from such facts? It is not to say, as some are inclined both to say and to teach, that it does not much matter what religious doctrines we profess, since our real religion is in any case settled on other grounds. Professed doctrine is bound to affect real religion in the long run. Either the real religion will tend to approximate to the professed doctrine; or else the discrepancy between the two will become increasingly apparent, until the conscious rejection of the doctrine drives the religion further in the opposite direction. And, moreover, the ultimate value of real religion, both in respect of goodness and in respect of truth, can only be tested and corrected if we give it some expression in definite intellectual and doctrinal form. It is therefore a futile and misleading policy for the teacher of religion merely to minimize the importance of theological differences, or to give the impression that doctrines do not matter. Whatever methods he may adopt, his essential aim must be to make clear the fundamental doctrines according to which human life ought to be directed, and to distinguish what is really fundamental from what is secondary and derivative. Inevitably any such clarification must involve the affirmation of propositions which may be and are disputed. The serious disputation of them on the part of the pupils is to be encouraged. But the discussion ought not to be merely dialectical and academic. And mere dialectics will be avoided if we succeed in impressing upon those whom we teach that it is no use arguing about the truth of a theological view until you have

grasped its bearing upon the whole task of human living, or, in other words, until you have seen its relation to the real religion by which men live or ought to live. It is not with the *abstract* truth but with the *relevance* of Christianity, as Canon Barry has put it in the striking title of a striking book, that we must be concerned throughout. But the notion of relevance certainly does not exclude relevance to the intellect or to the theoretic questionings which I think naturally are and ought to be specially prominent in the mind eighteen to twenty-three years old.

In what I have so far said I shall be justly accused of homiletic platitude. But I want to go on to indicate one or two points at which the relevance of Christian religion may be and needs to be made specially plain.

1. The first point is concerned with the co-ordination of human efforts towards a common end. Modern civilization, as we all know, has issued from the rejection of that ecclesiastical control over all the activities of life which was claimed, and to a great extent made operative, by the Church of the Middle Ages. The civilization of the Modern West has grown up on two closely allied principles, freedom of inquiry and specialization of work. The two principles hang together. For freedom in the modern world has come to mean the right of each specialized department of activity to reject all interference from outside. Science and all its various branches have developed and specialized themselves in independence of external control even from one another. The modern artist of course accepts no dictation from anyone else as to the aim of his activity; and many artists have developed new and highly specialized forms of technique which make their aim quite unintelligible to the general public. The systems of commerce and finance again have followed independent lines of special development, in the terrifying complication of which the aim of service to the community often seems to be lost altogether and the application of any ethical standards has become a matter of the greatest difficulty and doubt. Even sports and games, which would once have seemed to be clearly a quite subordinate province, have now been organized into an independent realm in which many find the main aim of living; and special codes of ethics are required for its regulation, the definition of which puzzles the L.T.A. and the F.A., and the various other authorities which have succeeded to the functions of the ancient priesthood. No one but a fool would seek to deny the enormous benefits which all this progress has conferred upon the human race through the increased control of environment which it has rendered possible. And yet, where there

is no central or universal authority, seen or unseen, which men recognize at all, human life inevitably loses all unity of aim; it dissipates itself in a multitude of special activities and conflicting interests which are never co-ordinated. The result is that modern history is writing for us a terribly fresh and instructive version of the myth of Babel. In England the full effects of the confusion are not yet apparent, because English people, being both insular and conservative by temperament, are still influenced in practice by the legacy of a religious tradition which they have ceased consciously to believe. But abroad there is no doubt where the freedom of the nineteenth century must lead. Tyrannies, dictatorships, and the totalitarian state are the accepted answer to the question.

But meanwhile what of religion? The natural effect of the developments I have described is plain enough. Religion has been dethroned from its former seat of authority, and has taken its place along with, say, art, as one of the departments of activity which in a well-ordered society will form the main business of a few and a part-time occupation of a good many, but should not be allowed to interfere with all the other activities which have an equal right to develop themselves along their own lines. In the eyes of modern England religion is an admirable pursuit for those possibly rather peculiar persons who have a natural bent in that direction, and it is well that it should be allowed some place in an educational curriculum. This departmental conception of religion is not of course held universally; but it is exceedingly popular, and it has influenced the practice of many religious people more than they would care to admit. In an age of specialization and toleration it is easy to cultivate religion even intensely, without relating it positively to the secular activities in which even religious persons for part of their time must be engaged. The demand for departmental religion was well represented by a recent leading article in a well-known newspaper, in which the writer asserted with much truth that the laity who worked on mundane affairs for six days out of the seven do not want to hear sermons about the League of Nations on Sunday, and it was urged for that reason that the clergy should confine themselves to spiritual sermons on Sundays of a kind which would refresh their congregations by taking their thoughts away from the occupations of the week. It is precisely this conception of religion which gives the Marxists excuse for saying that religion is dope.

Now the mind of youth, whatever its crudity, is at least not yet in this way specialized and limited. It is capable of understanding, if we can help it to understand, a religion which

is not one department of life, but co-ordinates and gives the ultimate aim to every department, so that in it and through it the hope is restored that all sorts and conditions of men in all the variety of their manifold specialized callings and occupations may yet work together in one spirit for one end, when our present tyrannies are overpast. But how is such a Catholic religion to be presented? We shall never restore the dictatorship of ecclesiastical or hierarchical authority. Apart from other considerations, modern life is too complicated to allow the possibility of such a restoration. Ecclesiastics themselves have of necessity too highly specialized a training and outlook upon life to be able to frame rules and regulations which will apply satisfactorily to all the variety of perplexing situations in which the layman in his particular calling needs the intellectual or ethical guidance of religion. Moreover, the highly specialized study of the Bible in modern times has inevitably made the Bible a more difficult, if a more interesting, book to teach and to apply than once it was. Definite, cut-and-dried Church-teaching of the good old sort will never meet our need. On the other hand, a merely undogmatic religion, at least as commonly understood, lacks altogether the co-ordinating and unifying power which the times demand and which apostolic Christianity, though on a small scale, undoubtedly provided. I would suggest very tentatively that perhaps what we really ought to do is to make a fresh start from the great Christian dogma of the Incarnation, understood as affirming that God revealed Himself supremely to mankind, not in any oracular deliverance nor in any specifically religious or mystical experience, but in the whole of one completely human life, a life lived wholly in the spirit of what the N.T. calls God's *agape*, the word we so unsatisfactorily translate as "love." As St. Paul in 1 Cor. xii. and xiii. is careful to point out, it is of the essence of agape that it can and must mingle with every other gift and function a man may possess, so as to lift it on to a Christian level and make its exercise a Christian service. Agape is not a specifically *religious* gift at all, according to that narrow sense which the modern world, taught partly by the psychologists, has given to religion. It is *the* gift and self-revelation of God to man in Christ. But the New Testament says almost nothing about *religion* as such. And I have sometimes wondered whether one of the greatest services a teacher of religion today could do might possibly be to help us first to dissociate our idea of God from our idea of "religion," so that we might afterwards reassociate them in a new way. So many, in seeking after a God-centred religion, which is the greatest thing in life, seem only to fashion for themselves a religion-centred God, which may

be the most delusive of idols. We need, I think, to rewrite for ourselves some great sayings and arguments of St. Paul, substituting "religion" for his "Jew," and "secular life" for his "Gentile."

But I must not digress too far into fields of general theology. What I want to suggest is this: The greatest thing perhaps we can do for the rising generation is so to interpret to them the Bible and Christian doctrine that they may see the meaning of agape as that which comes from God to man in Christ, and can really enter into, hold together in God's service, and give eternal worth to everything a man may think or do. Agape may help him to persevere in the even tenor of a comparatively quiet life. It may lead him into a monastic order. It may drive him to think and doubt and criticize for himself, and bring him into violent and distressing conflict with established authority. It may even make him face the black abyss of an ultimate scepticism. But, so long as he has it, the God revealed in Christ is with him; and he has a bond of fellowship with all men, and even with nature, which is really deeper than any apparent isolation. A man who loves, ἀγαπᾷ, will never develop the Ishmael-complex which is the source of bitterness and despair, or sometimes of brutal self-assertion and hardness of heart and mind. Only in this unity of the spirit of *agape* can we hope to find a principle of immanent authority which will gradually help the builders of our modern Babel to understand one another's speech, and to co-operate again upon a different kind of tower than that which they have hitherto imagined to be their aim.

2. One further point I should like to suggest. There is a certain type of Modernism on the one hand and of Traditionalism on the other which we must at all costs avoid. A superficial Modernism which is at the mercy of the shifting currents of contemporary thought is today especially dangerous because of the particular direction in which those currents are setting. To make a sweeping but broadly true generalization, the salient characteristic of modern thought is the abandonment of belief in the eternal. The most powerful and influential minds believe, not in eternal truth, but in temporal change. Our intellectual leaders, in spite of certain developments of the doctrine of relativity, seem to take *time* more and more seriously. And a temporalist metaphysic fits in well with the great Marxian dictum, "The business of our philosophy is not to understand the world but to change it." Most of the young are becoming pragmatists at heart, whether the pragmatism they prefer is that of Buchman or of Lenin. It may seem strange, but it is certainly true, that the disasters following 1914, with all the

infinite distress and misery they have brought, have done nothing whatever to shake that belief in the future which the nineteenth century first established in men's minds. In spite of all that has happened, men of all varieties of opinion are as convinced as ever that better times are soon coming or can be made to come, though many of them are much more ready than before to hasten their arrival by violence. The new powers bestowed by science are still too novel and too dazzling to permit any fundamental doubt of man's power to achieve the millennium by their use. Well, there is no harm in wanting to change the world; for the world wants changing. But it is most instructive to notice what happens when belief in time and the control of machinery ousts belief in eternal realities altogether. In a world where all is change and flux, men lose the conviction that the means taken to achieve an end must be morally appropriate to the end to be achieved. Mercy, freedom and truth in the future may, they think, be the outcome of cruelty, oppression and lying in the present. Why should not the classless society, which is the Marxist's heaven, be established by the ruthless dictatorship of the proletariate backed by the Czarist methods of the Ogpu? Why should not a noble and generous Germany issue from a sordid persecution of non-Aryans? Why should not the organized hypocrisy of a controlled press and wireless be the parent of the truth that is to be? Grapes may soon be gathered from thorns and figs from thistles, if there is no eternal law which decrees otherwise. It is most interesting to observe that in this matter science and orthodox religion have to a great extent changed places in recent years. It is orthodox religion which now maintains the fixity of law, and science which suggests the limitless possibility of miracle. And if the rising generation do not learn from an old-fashioned religion that there are eternal laws of a moral and spiritual order, they will not now learn those laws elsewhere, except through bitter experience of the consequences of ignoring them. This experience is what the New Testament calls falling under "the wrath of God"; and there is nothing particularly "religious" about it. It is a dread reality from which we may well pray to deliver ourselves and others. We must therefore greatly beware of the Modernism which, as St. Paul so expressively said, *συσχηματίζεται τῷ αἰῶνι τουτῷ*, and would have us conform our teaching to the latest fashion of thought in this changeable and changing world.

But we must equally beware even of appearing to look for support in that type of traditionalism which seeks safety in the letter of rules and definitions, and represents the Christian Church as a conservative institution concerned to maintain the

status quo at any rate in religion. There is, I suppose, no element in the true tradition of Christianity which ought to be treated like the talent which was wrapped up and buried so that it might be produced again punctually on demand with the assurance that it had never been endangered or defaced by use. I do not believe in what are commonly called Christian apologetics. At any rate I am sure that the name ought not to be used, except to be condemned. To talk " apologetics " is to seem to put the Christian religion on the defensive, and to suggest that the main duty of Christians is to protect it and keep it safe. This suggestion is not only psychologically an error, if we would commend religion to the young; it is also definitely untrue. The Christian religion is not on the defensive, and should not therefore be so presented. The real question is not whether it can be safeguarded against critical attacks, but whether the modern world can see enough of its eternal meaning to save itself in time. We must dispel the notion that Christian faith means clinging for the sake of comfort and security to an infallible orthodoxy of the past. The last thing it is meant to be is a bulwark against revolution. Modern society, however different from that of the first century, is still far too like the world which the New Testament condemns not to stand in need of change as drastic as any Marxist could propose. But Christian faith does stand for the principle that the really effective revolution is that which works from within outwards, and begins in the soul. Apart from the change of heart which religion brings, a series of political and economic upheavals, and even more violent manipulations of the human organism itself, such as those adumbrated by imaginative biologists, may only succeed in taking mankind back to a kind of life which in spiritual principle was old-fashioned before the Ten Commandments were heard of, or even before Adam fell. The Athenians, who " spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing," mistook for an old wives' fable the only really new thing they were ever told. The youth of to-day, surrounded by the novelties of inventive science, needs more than anything else to be taught by Christianity that in agape alone newness of life consists and eternal truth is to be found.

THE MESSAGE OF NICHOLAS BERDYAEV

BEFORE considering the latest book* of Professor Berdyaev to be presented to English readers, it may be well to refer to a quality that belongs to all the work of this great Russian writer, or perhaps one may more fitly say this great modern prophet.

He is a Russian through and through and therefore different in temperament and outlook from ourselves. Occasionally in estimating some part of his message we have to make heavy allowance for that difference. But all who have studied Berdyaev would surely agree that more than any other living writer he seems to possess a most remarkable power of standing back even from quite contemporary events, and seeing them in a true proportion. What makes his message so peculiarly valuable is that his measures of significance seem to be hardly ever wrong. He does not make the error that many of our English and still more American writers make, of confusing present noise with permanent importance. He is never like the chicken who supposed that the sky had fallen and that he must go and tell the king because an acorn had dropped upon his own head. And it is this vision of true proportion and real relationships that makes Berdyaev a more trustworthy interpreter of events than any other writer, and always from a really Christian point of view.

When we pass on to consider the substance of the present book we find that it is of extreme importance to the English clergy, not because it launches upon them an idea that is startlingly new, but rather because it illuminates in a very striking way a line of teaching, or again one may use the word prophecy, which has long been working in their minds and which at least occasionally spurts out into the sermons of many. And the main theme of this prophecy is capable of a very simple expression; for it is just that of the Divine Judgment upon human self-sufficiency that is here and now being revealed in the events of the times.

We have all seen this truth. We are aware that we are looking out on a world that is being shaken out of self-complacence. But there is probably no other living writer who could illuminate and expand this fact as Berdyaev has done. He traces out, on the one hand, the long train of historical

* *The End of Our Time*, by N. A. Berdyaev, Director of the Academy of the Philosophy of Religion, Paris. English translation, Sheed and Ward. *Freedom and the Spirit* (G. Bles) has been published since this article was written.

causes, and, what is even more valuable, he helps us to form in our minds some image of what it is all going to mean in the future to the life of the world and the witness of the Church.

By the title *The End of Our Time* Berdyaev means that we have come definitely to the end of that era which we have known as "modern history," and which in Berdyaev's view is simply the later stages of the period which we call the Renaissance. Berdyaev will not allow us to say, in our easy-going English optimistic way, that we are in a "transition" period, for that term implies a knowledge of direction that we do not in fact possess. We must as Christians simply acknowledge that we are in the hands of God; we have been brought quite definitely to the end of our "modern world" with all its characteristic tendencies, inspirations, and traditions. We stand at the threshold of an unknown and therefore an unnamed era. We know very little about its nature and still less of the sort of movements that may be born in it. The only thing that we may feel fairly confident about is that it will not be a period of gradual straight-line developments, but far more probably of violent swerves and even sudden catastrophes.

We cannot count in the future upon the working of any of those social and cultural tendencies that we have grown so used to that we almost confuse them with laws of nature. We stand as the Christians stood when the old world of Roman order broke down and a sea of barbarism enveloped the Church. We stand at the dawn of a New Middle Ages, though we have no means of knowing how far they are likely to resemble the old Middle Ages. Here a note as to terminology is necessary or we shall plunge into confusion. By the "Middle Ages" Berdyaev does not mean the period running in English history up, say, to the Tudors and immediately preceding the Modern Age. He includes in his term the Renaissance the whole period from the thirteenth century to the present day, and by the Middle Ages he means what we mean by the Dark Ages and the early part of our Middle Ages. The arrangement is of course of great importance to his argument; for that argument is that the artistic and literary development that we usually call the Renaissance was only one phase of the same movement that later produced the scientific and technological development of our own times. And lastly it is important to notice that he does not regard the Great War as having ended the Renaissance in any causal sense. It only made obvious that collapse of the whole humanistic tendency that long before had become clear to spiritual discernment.

Now, dealing with the Renaissance in Berdyaev's inclusive sense, we have to be careful not to think of it as a local move-

ment, or as one affecting only certain classes. We have to look deeper and wider than at Italian art or the revival of classic architecture, or we shall miss the wood in looking at the trees. The Renaissance has been all through, from the thirteenth century to the present day, an era of constant characteristics, determined by the same cause and affecting the whole of our European life. The cause may be summed up in the word "humanism," that is to say man's consciousness of the innate powers and capacities of his own being.

It would be most unfair to regard Berdyaev as a mere fanatic, condemning humanism root and branch, and irresponsibly prophesying woe upon all human attempts at self-realization in the manner of a sort of Solomon Eagle. He is not at all a prophet of that kind. It is not "humanism," but the de-humanizing of life by the perversion of humanism, that is his enemy. Not man's consciousness of his native worth, but the worshipping of that native worth in place of God. He expressly makes it clear that in its early stages there was no divorce between the spirit of the Renaissance and that of the Christian faith. It is true that it proceeded from a stirring of the humanistic tendency, but why should it not? The revival of that tendency was much needed. In the Dark Ages the Church had been concerned not with the development of man's powers, but simply with the bringing of order into chaos, and expelling from the ways of human life the very foul mud that the collapse of Paganism had left. Priapus must be expelled from the garden before it was safe to encourage man's powers of horticulture; the heathen gods must be cast down from the vault of heaven before man could profitably turn to astronomy. It was necessary; but it brought about a static, rather than a dynamic, view of life.

Then, in the thirteenth century, there came into the Catholic world a new consciousness of the native worth and powers of man, and a glimmering of an idea of how these could be used for the purposes of God's Kingdom. This led immediately not to harking back to Pagan ideals, but only to Pagan patterns of expression; and necessarily so, for there were no such patterns to be found in the barbarism of the intervening period. But it was essentially an inspiring of the recovered arts of Paganism by the Christian faith and spirit. So the early period was a wonderful flowering time of that almost inexpressible sort that you become aware of equally when you begin to sympathize with St. Francis of Assisi, or begin to understand the work of the Italian primitive painters. There is no question of "finish"; there is a childlikeness about the whole thing. But it was the childhood, the springtime of the Christian spirit learning to

express itself in consecrating, rather than fleeing from, the human and the earthly; all through the attitude is one of sheer adoration, and there is no hint yet of the perversion of a boasted self-sufficiency.

But the seeds of the disaster were really in the movement from the start, and they were not long in germinating. For the basis of the Renaissance was humanism, and humanism is always ready to become the foundation for the Tower of Babel. After the first stages this humanism got beyond the control of faith, and the history of Europe from that point onwards became the history of the increasing assertion by man of his own self-sufficiency, and consequently the increasing denial by man of his need of God. This has been revealed in the less and less consecrated development of every conceivable human power until we reach the culmination in our own century, when man's own applied science is the throne to which all people bow, and the technologist takes the place of the priest or prophet as the trusted guide of life. There is the essence of modern secularism. It matters very little—much less than most English people seem to see—whether it takes the form of atheism, as it has in Russia, or whether, as in England, it is still apt to cling to so much of the ideology of religion as happens to suit its purpose. The point is that the necessity, and therefore the control, of the Divine and the supernatural are put away from life. Religion, it if remains, gets pushed aside as a mere cultus into a department of life, and is only allowed to emerge if in so doing it denies its own true nature by providing sanctions for such moral ideals and standards as man has seen fit to select for himself. Very much that has been called religion for three centuries past has been nothing but humanism disguised under a religious terminology, and the philosophy of Schleiermacher, especially, made a wide and far-reaching road for the spreading of that error in such a guise as to deceive even the elect.

And now has come *The End of Our Time.* In spiritual discernment we already see, what every day of current history is making more evident, that this era of humanism has run its course. It has proved to be a blind alley; it is bankrupt of all creative ideas. It started out to bring man to a realization of his own powers; it has landed him in a thorough disbelief in himself. It began in confidence; it is ending in despair. And to the eye of faith the reason is unmistakable—it is that humanism uncontrolled by faith leads to a break with the real depth of man's own soul; it brings a disruption between the ways of living and the meaning of life. The radical blunder of secularism, as Brunner has pointed out even more strikingly than Berdyaev,

is that it has taken human nature for granted. It has encouraged scepticism and neutrality towards the Divine, and has assumed a recklessly positive estimate of the human. "Let theologians and zealots dispute as they will. Here, anyway, is human nature, and the whole future depends simply on developing its powers as rapidly as possible."

But the very word "nature" signifies a "process," a "becoming"; and obviously there is more than one way in which a process can proceed and a becoming become. That is why what has happened in the modern world has been something so wholly different from what was imagined by the early humanists and the fathers of the Renaissance, and no less, we may add, from what was imagined by those semi-religious secularists who have so much affected our English outlook. Because human nature came to be divorced from its spiritual background there has been a becoming in an inhuman direction. And this direction has been not merely towards moral and social chaos, but even more towards impotence and futility. The Renaissance began by freeing the creative forces of man; the Church should not only not deny the fruits, the marvellous fruits, of this fact, but should endeavour to save the world from losing those fruits. Berdyaev pleads for no return to the "simple savage." But the Renaissance went on to separate man from the spiritual sources of his life by a chasm of pride which cannot be closed by shovelling in tons of man-made moralism and calling it religion. The Renaissance, or as we should call it "the modern world," has denied spiritual man, who cannot help being a creator; it has affirmed instead the merely natural man, who is a slave of necessity. It has therefore condemned to sterility and ruin the very powers it set out to liberate.

Now we come to a very interesting part of Berdyaev's message. For when we ask the question how far does the world realize the impotence of merely natural man—how far is it disillusioned?—he does not simply point to all the political unrest and pessimism that we only need to read the newspapers in order to realize; his view, as we might expect, is wider and deeper. He shews us how the world-philosophies that have appeared during the last century are very various on the surface; but underneath they all have in common one most significant element. This is a growing distrust in human nature, and an attempt to provide some sort of abstraction that shall make up for its deficiencies. It was not so, say, in the days of the Enlightenment and just beyond. The philosophy that led up to the French Revolution was quite satisfied with man's abundant sufficiency. Break off the inequalities of his environment; let him enjoy liberty, equality, and brotherhood and all would be

well, even though, or rather just because, his own human reason was enthroned in the place of God. In the nineteenth century this note of confidence wavers, and a complete break comes in the philosophy of Nietzsche. Man becomes an object of contempt. He can achieve nothing. The only use for him is to pave the way for the arrival of that really effective, though wholly supposititious, being whom he calls Superman. Now of course the only thing we know for certain about "Superman" is that he remains "Superman"; he is a pure abstraction. No doubt if he did appear he would be from the Christian point of view thoroughly objectionable; we should probably call in the police to deal with him. But all that is a side-issue. The point is that he had to be invented, for otherwise there would be no chance of pretending that humanity can reach its goal. And in every modern philosophy one finds this same element. In Collectivism, Fascism, Naziism, humanity is only useful if it is crushed into pulp for the purpose of attaining some wonderful superhuman state which is theoretic and abstract. Superman is a substitution for God; the totalitarian State is an imitation Church; but it is a spurious communion mediating not the heavenly but only the earthly.

In all this is plain the recognition that humanism has failed. Man has ceased to be regarded as man and has become merely so much economic material. It is only in the measure that Europe has not repudiated God that the idea of humanity retains any creative power. Irreligious Europe is pursuing will-o'-the-wisps because it has lost its faith in man as well as in God.

So much, then, for *The End of Our Time*. What about the unknown era on the threshold of which we are standing? Berdyaev is a difficult author to abridge, because isolated passages taken out of their context might easily give the impression that he is a mere pessimist. In reality he is nothing of the sort. In this respect his message rings strikingly true to that of the New Testament itself, for his pessimism is the measure of his essential and underlying optimism. Man's failure is complete, and one can hardly paint it too black. But that failure is God's opportunity, and therefore the opportunity of His Church. The darkness is the sign of the approaching dawn of a new religious age. The first call for faith is not to fear the working out of the issue, and still less to pray that the clouds may pass, and that there may be a return of the old sort of fool's-paradise sunshine. The Church must fully accept the closing in of the darkness as in a sense of God, believing that God can use and overrule it for His purpose. As the Prophets of old realized that even the heathen Cyrus was an instrument of the Divine

purpose; as the Church has never denied that the Cross was a calamity, and yet has always taught that it was overruled for victory, so we need not doubt that God can use the collapse of humanism for the training of men's souls. It is all a question on our side of the tenacity of faith and the other-worldliness of witness. The untruth of Christianity, of which the world so justly complains, has been a failure not of our religion or of our God, but of ourselves. We have been grievously infected by humanism and have bowed down to its idols; therefore we have been wasting our strength in self-affirmation rather than in the affirmation of God.

And the world is being prepared for that affirmation; for already in the better part of mankind there is an awakening of the true "home-sickness" for the country of the soul. Men do see that to find reality they must go deeper than humanism, and that history proves, as plainly as religion teaches, that you can make nothing of this earthly life in terms only of its earthly affairs. But we must expect, and humbly go through, a period of letting God dispel the false light of the modern world that we have been all too ready to walk in, and we must go into the night of the New Middle Ages in trustful courage. All this has come about more suddenly and more intensely in Russia. Russia, historically, has been outside the Renaissance and reaped nothing of its benefits. It merely took over its fruits at the moment of decay and carried the movement to its furthest pitch of destructiveness. The Church in Russia is already back in the catacombs. But it is really there; it is not destroyed or dead; and if only it can free itself from a merely reactionary spirit, which is born of the same spiritual obtuseness as Bolshevism, it will recover new life.

Now when we talk of "going into the darkness" we have to be very careful what we mean, or we may find ourselves guilty of mere phrase-mongering. It is darkness, of course, only from a rationalist point of view. It is "darkness" because the outlook of the times we have been accustomed to will be over and done with, and we shall not be able to define movements and tendencies or to foresee their effects. But it is the darkness of the "abyss of reality," in which we shall escape from temporal illusions, and be more, not less, able to discern between fundamental good and evil. Those who have read St. John of the Cross's *Dark Night of the Soul*, or that wonderful bit of fourteenth-century English mysticism called *The Cloud of Unknowing*, will not have much difficulty in getting at Berdyaev's meaning. The point is that when current values and criteria are discredited the means of research and the modes of expression that we are used to inevitably fail us. The rationalist therefore

thinks that we are lost. But men of vision may under those very circumstances begin to see, or rather to sense, essential and fundamental matters with a greater conviction than ever before. St. John of the Cross was more convinced of the Divine reality in the Dark Night than ever he had been in the light of day.

But Berdyaev warns us that we must not expect the passing of the old daylight to be a peaceful experience. It is more likely to take place in great upheaval and even vast calamities. Berdyaev, of course, in all this is Russian to the core. He is much clearer than most Englishmen that the Christian faith is not meant to save us from suffering, but to teach us how to suffer. And he has nothing of the Englishman's unconquerable faith in that blessed word "evolution." Indeed, he expressly states his belief that soon even such terms as "progress" or "reaction" will have lost their meaning; for the world will have been so turned upside-down that men will have lost—they are losing now—all sense of direction. Obviously, too, there have been times in history when reaction, if only it looks back far enough and not to the immediate past, is the truest line of progress.

But amid a lot that Berdyaev admits is sheer guess-work, he is confident as to a few of the main features of the age that is before us, and one may conclude by trying to express them.

The New Age will be a religious age in the sense that it will not be neutral. The nineteenth-century ideal of a state deliberately founded on neutrality—in other words, the right of the individual not to seek truth or even to trouble his head about it—all that will be abandoned as the impossible thing that the Communists rightly perceive it to be. The flight from God, which has vitiated so much of our modern sociological and scientific outlook, will become much more definitely a flight to Satan. There rears up against the God-man, Jesus Christ, not the benevolently undecided man of the intermediate kingdom, but the self-made man-god who has put himself in the place of God.

Nineteenth-century individualism must fail as an ideal for much the same reason. It was part of that same illusion of "neutrality," whereas all sensible men see now that religion cannot be "each man's private concern." If you hold a religion contrary to another man's, then the moment you begin to educate his son, or marry his daughter, or even vote for the Borough Council, you are striking at his religion. Therefore all aspects of life in the New Middle Ages will be seen to be grouped under opposed principles. This is the state of things Russia has already reached, and the rest of the world will

follow her, however long this or that country may manage to disguise it. Men will be forced more and more to decisions, and this will render impossible the old forms of government which have been based so largely on the idea of the right of the individual to be neutral towards truth.

There are many other points of very great interest, as, for instance, Berdyaev's almost staggering description of official Soviet philosophy; or the way he shews that the law of a nation can give place, as in Italy or Germany, to what he calls the mere socio-biological energy of that nation. Obviously if international law follows suit the socio-biological energies of nations will clash with each other to produce something in the way of wars we can hardly imagine.

But one must pass over all that and conclude by going back a few steps to a point which cannot be repeated too often if we are not to misunderstand Berdyaev's whole message. Once more, he is not a blind reactionary against humanism in the best sense of the word. He is clear that our Lord came that we might have life and have it more abundantly, and that there should be temporal as well as eternal fruition of that life. We are not to abandon, but to redeem the good that there was in humanism before it got distorted into what he calls "this crystallized evil of the Modern World." Purged by whatever suffering the New Middle Ages may bring upon us, we may be able not to acquiesce in a return to barbarism, but to recover the essential truth of man's native worth. We should not shun, but enter gladly, even if tremblingly, into the spiritual aspect of the world-revolution, believing that we may bring out of it a renewal of our whole consciousness of the meaning of life, and a renewed power to bring our ways of living into harmony with that meaning.

ALAN H. SIMPSON.

THE PLACE FOR DREAMS IN THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL

[It is proposed to treat the matter in two parts. Part I. is an attempt to state the nature of the conflict, Part II. to suggest some way of finding peace.]

PART I.—THE CONFLICT

IT is found that very strong impressions come to us in dreams. It is very consoling to be assured sometimes that we are in no way morally responsible for the actions we conceive ourselves to be taking in dreams. It is consoling also to reflect that the

most excellent people often shew exactly the opposite tendencies in their dreams to what they would shew in conscious life. It is said, too, that good people will, under an anæsthetic, sometimes give vent to very strong language, as they would never do at other times.

But to argue from this that dreams have no connection with self or sin or conscience, is perhaps to assume too much. We have reason to believe that dreams do have a real relation to life sometimes. They reflect, at least so we think, what we are anxious about or worried about. So perhaps we may trace in them something of the past or present conflicts of our souls.

The action in the dream may give a representation, even if a very contorted representation, of past conduct, of at least past consent or partial consent to what we normally reject or desire to reject. Then if in future dreams there is alteration, this may shew what is taking place in the conscience or soul. We may find we grow stronger to resist evil or be warned by the contrary.

One who used to be much troubled in dreams by the appearance of grave hindrances from without to the proper performances of his duties has told us that now he is not so distressed, even when the hindrances appear. He says that he takes them more philosophically. We imagine that means, in other words, that his trust in God's good purpose for him is steadier. If so, his whole faith in God is getting more constant and abiding.

We would consider on what such reasoning may be based.

I.—The Self

We propose to regard the self (1) as moved by things from without—that is, by different stimuli, some of which provide temptations. We do not mean that the self so moved is tossed like an inanimate thing before a storm, but that there are forces from without which affect it.

(2) We regard it as, for all that, never moved without its own consent having been won, at least to some extent. It is, we claim, responsible for having been moved. It has rejected or accepted what has been offered. So the self has acted. Not simply independently on its own initiative, but it has acted by its own consent to what has come to it from elsewhere. For that it is responsible, for that it must be judged. It is not simply independent, but it acts by its own consent.

(3) *Truly it is not independent.* It depends upon a force from outside to move it, and on an attraction to which it goes. It is dependent both for its initiative and for its end.

(4) On that account it is not the less free. In proportion

as it depends upon God it is free. Our Lord was free, because He was only free to accomplish the purpose for which He existed. If freedom were to consist in being free to do wrong as well as right, then our Lord would not have been free. He was free because He could do nothing but what was right—always wholly free to do the will of His Father. St. Augustine tells us "posse non peccare, magna est libertas; non posse peccare, maxima est."

We will try to indicate how far dreams shew oneself to be moved by impressions from outside, and to what extent we have power to reject them.

II.—The Effect of Dreams upon Oneself

Dreams may sometimes be simply of the kind known as wish-fulfilments. In the dream all difficulties are easily overcome and the desired end is achieved. We want perhaps to fly, and in the dream we find ourselves flying. Such a dream when remembered may serve to shew in what direction our wishes would take us.

But there are, for some at least, other kinds of dreams. In such the past is recalled, though sometimes differently enacted. Persons with whom we have had dealings appear in the dream. It may be that the wish realized then, but put away, returns in the dream when it is not put away but accepted. This may be an indication that the suggestion was not wholeheartedly put away. If so, the heart is condemned as not single. There may have been a severe conflict or inward struggle in the dream, but the conscience was defeated and the wrong done. Does it mean that the self which is found sinful in the dreams is wishful to sin although loath to sin? It is a divided self which in dreams sins. Then the unified self will be sinless in dreams.

III.—The Unified Self Rejects Temptation

Let us suppose that other dreams follow, and let us suppose that in these a similar suggestion is similarly met by the conscience with disapproval. This time there is a much stronger disinclination, owing to a deeply held conviction that final satisfaction does not lie that way. There is still a brief struggle, owing to the promise which the suggestion makes that there is some pleasure there; but it is seen to be unsatisfactory, incomplete, it is refused and peace reigns.

(1) *Children's Dreams without Disfigurement.*—In an article in Theology for February, 1928, Mr. Lindsay Dewar proffers what seems a reasonable explanation for this kind of thing.

It supposes the will to yield and what it calls "disfigurement" to follow in consequence. It attributes this to a "Divided Personality," which is to be accounted for by sin, and says that such "disfigurement" does not follow in the dreams of children, because they are free from actual sin.

(2) *The Appearance in the Dream of a Partner in Sin Involves the Dreamer.*—It seems not unreasonable to suppose from this, that though the soul at the time of the dream is blameless, yet it has been involved in sin earlier. This argument is enforced if a particular occasion of sin is recalled in the dream. It may be that the actual persons with whom the dreamer has, in thought at least, consented to sin, are present in the dream, and so provide more conclusive evidence of the former occasion of sin.

(3) *Later Dreams, if without Disfigurement, are a Ground for Solid Encouragement.*—This may be accounted for in cases where the will has formerly had the permission of the self to yield, but later the temptation was rejected. Then the temptation was recognized as a false promise to satisfy the heart's legitimate and strong desire; the whole man, of which the self is master, rejects the proposal and peace is found in victory.

PART II.—THE DIRECT TREATMENT OF THE SOUL

[The consideration of the above starts the enquiry as to how we are to deal with the problem as it affects our own lives.]

I.—The Disorder is of the Nature of Sin

Sins may be unknown and a real ground for pity, but (1) *nevertheless such sins are a reality.* This at any rate is true, that the straightforward soul has to confess sins which it knows not of. The words are put into our mouths in the form for confession we ordinarily use. If at first the words seem strange or even unreal to us, in after years, by experience, we realize the truth contained in them. As we look back on days gone by we are able to say: "Little as I thought it at the time, I can see now where I was wrong." As we know more of life and of ourselves, we come no doubt to see that perhaps the major part of our confessions is contained in the words: "All my other sins which I know not of." Then "secret sins" are found to mean much more than the sins which we conceal or desire to conceal from others. Besides all these, there are the sins which in our blindness are hidden from ourselves, though perhaps all the time they are only too well known to others. Such thoughts gradually cause the prayer "Cleanse Thou me from my secret faults" to be uttered with increasing reality. Yet (2) *these*

unknown "secret" sins can be forgiven. Such surely can be and, we must believe, are freely forgiven, while still unknown to the sinner. Confessed they have been, if nothing that we know of has been consciously concealed. Inasmuch we have added the words: "Which we know not of or cannot now remember." We do not doubt that the goodness of God receives from us what we never wished to keep back. The confession is as complete as we are able at the time to make it. We have asked God to make known to us the matter of our confession in our preliminary prayer, and doubtless He has done so, as far as it is good for us to know it. It would then be wrong to grieve that we know no more. In His own way and at His own time, God will remove what we have been unable to specify. For this we are ready to wait upon Him. This waiting upon Him, we are prepared to find, means some self-discipline—striving to correct what we see and know to be wrong and imperfect, and being ready to be enlightened, even though it may mean hard work or humiliation and some alteration in our ways at real cost to ourselves. (3) *The undisciplined heart is disposed to sin.* When the heart has failed to make the alterations which the conscience has required, then the sin remains or even returns. For the servant who, because he will not forgive his fellow-servant, is again counted guilty—although he was once forgiven, hearing the words, "I forgave thee all that debt," together with his sentence of condemnation—appears to be an instance of how the guilt of forgiven sin can return when the life is not altered. So where there is no alteration the disposition to sin remains. When fresh sin has been actually added, the disposition to sin has been greatly strengthened, and a barrier once raised by forgiveness has been broken down. This we believe to be quite enough to account for the yielding of the conscience which in the dream has consented to sin, and it suggests a remedy.

II.—The Remedy for "Secret Faults"

Those who complain of the conflict between the conscience and the inclination do desire a remedy, and that leaves us at liberty to deal with the inclination with the hope of setting it free.

(1) *The Inclination must be dealt with.*—If the inclination to sin is due to double-mindedness or divided personality in which the inclination conquers the will, then we need to deal with the inclination. In this connection psycho-analysis is sometimes suggested as the remedy and is often said, we believe quite erroneously, to bear a strong resemblance to sacramental

confession. We mention the subject only to leave it, lest we be drawn from the main subject to a subsidiary one, but before leaving it we would state some marked differences between the two methods:

(*a*) In psycho-analysis all possible excuses for the disorder are searched for and produced, such as environment, education, etc. The faults of the parents are all laid bare: "the Early-Victorian grandmother," and the "over-indulgent, narrow-minded, fundamentalist father," etc. Whereas in confession, on the contrary, excuses are carefully kept out and the words "Through my fault, my own fault," etc., are specially put in. It might seem almost as though in confession we try to confess our own sins, but in psycho-analysis those of our parents, which to some may be preferable, but the two are not identical. No doubt parallel use of both psycho-analysis and confession is often profitable.

(*b*) In the analysis every effort is made to trace the origin of any unreasonableness—why, for instance, the sound of a particular accent is associated in the patient's mind with cruelty. It is especially important to discover the origins, for recovery is held largely to depend on this uprooting.

(*c*) In confession the penitent accepts forgiveness and healing without any merit of his own, if only he heartily desires it. He is warned that a *complete* change of heart is a gift from God, which it may take a lifetime to find. He has not to wait for change of heart before he is forgiven, but receives his gift of pardon, saying: "Just as I am without one plea."

To return to the other question, not of recovery but of pardon by sacramental confession and absolution, confession is held to be adequate if only the facts are briefly stated. It is never supposed to be possible for any penitent to make a complete statement of even his own sins, so that he is taught to say, "For these and all my other sins," etc., and to leave it at that. Forgiveness is won by something other than his own efforts.

(2) *The United Personality Chooses with the Whole Self.*—The happy state of a united personality is the reward of the soul that abides with God. It is not usually found immediately and continuously on reconciliation, as the life of John Wesley witnesses in his journal. Grace for resistance is to be frequently asked, and the desire for it will grow. As the petition is made,

God is Himself chosen instead of the alternative satisfaction which the desire offers. If in the subconscious life the desire always wins, it is otherwise in the conscious life. There the lives of all the saints witness to the other, to the victory of the conscience in spite of difficulty.

III.—A Free Personality is the Outcome of the Remedy

(1) *Freedom is Found in Prayer.*—If complete change of heart is *given* in a moment, yet it is only *found as an abiding possession*, which even sudden temptation is powerless to overthrow, as it is acted upon. That is as the outcome of a life of devotion, which learns in all things to know and love God, and so to choose Him. This is a really free personality, free in all things to choose God. This freedom is found in the practice of prayer. The soul set free learns to delight in prayer.

(2) *It is a Prayer of Oblation more than of Petition.*—It delights to express itself more in giving than in asking, and asks only for power to give more. So we are brought round again to a familiar theme—namely, that the mastery of self and peace of mind and the knowledge of God are to be found by the art of arts, the science of prayer.

(3) *Effectual Prayer is Found in Obedience to the First and Great Commandment.*—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart . . ." To desire to accept this command is the prayer that knows and loves and chooses God as the supreme end of life, in which the whole personality is united and set free.

SUMMARY

The following is offered as a summary of the argument presented above:

1. As we are constituted, undesirable tendencies to evil do exist in all human hearts.

2. These desires, if entertained together with desires for good, do result in a kind of divided personality.

3. Such divided personality produces an uneasiness which robs youth of much of its natural happiness and hopefulness and usefulness.

4. The treatment known as psycho-analysis, which has been recommended for this condition when advanced, is often thought strongly to resemble sacramental confession, but it has some marked differences, some only of which are listed under nos. 5 and 6 below.

5. In psycho-analysis:

(*a*) All excuses are given prominence.

(*b*) Every effort is made to trace the source and nature of any peculiarity.

(*c*) The patient is then encouraged to take a different attitude by recognizing on what unreasonable grounds his earlier attitude has been based. On the completeness of this attitude his recovery depends.

6. In sacramental confession:

(*a*) Excuses are purposely avoided, and the words, "Through my fault, my own fault," etc., are offered instead.

(*b*) The penitent is encouraged to take for granted that he has not got to the bottom of the matter, and is given the words, "For these and all my other sins which I cannot now remember or know not of," with which to conclude.

(*c*) The whole matter of change of heart is looked for from God, to be given as He sees best. Forgiveness is accepted at once, although the humble soul will be prepared to find that complete change of heart may take a long time.

7. The position taken in this article is that the disposition to do evil, noticeable in the dream, is in no way wrong, but that it has followed wrong done in the past. That wrong done has increased the desire and the actual incident is often recollected in some way in the dream. But—

8. That evil desire can be undermined and finally entirely removed by the provision of some greater alternative desire, which actually sets the heart consequently free, without going into the unpleasant circumstances of the bad dream, as would be done in psycho-analysis.

9. That this overwhelmingly strong desire, in every case, is to be found in obedience to the call given to every human being in the "First and Great Commandment."

10. That this commandment is to be observed by the practice of prayer by each one along the lines which God has purposed for him, out of His individual love.

P. S. WIGRAM, S.S.J.E.

THE REALISTIC CRUCIFIX

IT is open to question whether it is commonly realized that the Crucifix of today—the Crucifix of the Western Church—is not the most ancient form. The most ancient form was not realistic but symbolic. The Christ is there as Conqueror—the Victorious King. He stands robed and crowned as an earthly monarch; He stands with outstretched arms before the Cross. That ancient form had a fine gospel for the Church militant. It appealed to Christian people as soldiers. It reminded them that Calvary was a battlefield upon which the great decisive battle of the great war between good and evil was fought and won. It was instinct with hope. It bade men remember and bear in mind that the final victory of the good over evil was assured. That most ancient form, in spite of all that it stood for, was swept away; its place was taken by the realistic Crucifix —the realistic Crucifix we see today on our rood screens, above our pulpits, and even on our altars, in spite of the fact that strictly the altar should not be the place of the realistic Crucifix, for the Holy Eucharist is rather the joyful commemoration of

all that the Christ won for us by His Blessed Passion, and many feel that beyond the rood we should find depicted not the sufferer but the Victorious King, the Conqueror. In the realistic Crucifix Christian art has simply striven to put before the eyes of men and women that which was seen as men and women passed and repassed before the Cross on Calvary. Christ is not robed but stripped—nailed—pierced—crowned, not with the diadem of earthly monarch, but with the crown of thorns—in the collapse of death. Sometimes, but not often, the idea of Christ the Conqueror is hinted at—the Head erect, not fallen in the collapse of death.

The ancient Crucifix—the symbolic form—had a gospel for men and women as Christian soldiers. The realistic form has rather a gospel for a suffering world. It has won the heart of Christendom because it has such fine ideas of God for us. It has won the heart of Christendom because it has such truth to teach us about pain and suffering. We may lament the fact that the realistic Crucifix swept away, in common use, the more ancient form; we may plead for a recapture of that form—the King and the Conqueror. Around us there are men and women who find in the modern Crucifix a stumbling-block, because they say that the great central symbol of the Christian religion seems to speak of defeat, not victory. But, as a fact, we know that it is the realistic form which has won and wins the heart of mankind, drawing the human heart as a mighty magnet. It is well that, in the face of this fact, we should pause and ask ourselves—why has this realistic form won the hearts of men ?

About eighty years ago F. W. Robertson was preaching his wonderful sermons at Brighton. Among those sermons there is a most striking one on the "Glory of the Virgin Mother." Many a preacher of those days, if he had been preaching on Our Lady, would have felt it his duty to preach against the cultus of the Blessed Mother. Robertson's treatment is wonderfully suggestive. He saw the great place that the cultus of the Blessed Virgin took among a vast number of Christian people. He just took it and he asked this question: "How is this ? Why is it that this cultus has such a place in Christendom ?" The answer which Robertson gave was this. He held that it came from a defective teaching of theology. Teachers spoke of man being made in the image of God. But God made man "male and female." Theologians had loved to take man in so far as he came up to the ideal as a "mirror of God." But they had taken "father" and left out "mother"—the mother in her winsomeness and mercy and gentleness. In a very wonderful way Robertson taught his hearers that the real line to take was not to cry down the cultus of the Blessed Virgin,

but rather bring out that not only fatherhood but motherhood is an earthly reflection of Deity. He put it in this way. The human heart seeks a mother in Heaven and because theologians had spoken of God in terms of fatherhood only, men and women turned to Mary—the Mother—to satisfy their natural desires. The writer of this paper brings before his readers this sermon of Robertson's, because it seems to suggest that we should never despise that which manifestly appeals to the human heart. When we come across that which makes a strong and mighty appeal to men, we should pause; we should ask this question: "What lies at the root of this?" As an actual fact we find as we look back that the realistic Crucifix won all hearts—swept away to a very large extent the more ancient form of the Conqueror, the Victorious King. It is well that we should pause before this realistic Crucifix and try and fathom the causes which led to this sweeping away of the older form for the newer.

We have already touched on man made in the image of God; man, therefore, in so far as he attains the ideal, is a mirror in which we get glimpses of the Divine. But, as we think on those lines, it must be realized that although man is "the mirror"—a revelation of Divinity—it is open to question whether He who is worshipped with the angelic cry, "Holy! Holy! Holy!" can in any sense be fully revealed in terms of human life. In man God may be revealed, but it is open to question whether that revelation can be regarded as exhaustive. It must be remembered—it is sometimes forgotten—that there are great depths of the Divine which cannot be revealed in humanity. As, however, we ponder over human life and grasp its beauty, it is realized that that which is lovely and beautiful in humanity must be found in Divinity. It is such ideas which seem to lead to our being able to answer in part the question that we ask—What is the singular attraction of the realistic Crucifix?—for one of the very finest features which appear in human life and appeal most strongly to the human heart is the magnificent feature of self-sacrifice, the capacity for suffering for others. It is like a thread of gold woven into the very texture of human life; it reveals itself to us in the family, in every sphere of human life. It is the fine revelation of the Christian virtue of love, which is no mere emotion but is essentially a practical virtue found in man—man made in the image of God. We cannot but feel this capacity for suffering must be found in God. It was just that feeling which led Charles Kingsley in one of his letters to say: "My heart demands the Trinity as well as my reason." To him Christ must be God, no mere human prophet. In the Crucified we find the great answer to the cry of the

human heart—the demand that that which is fine in the creature must be found in the Creator. The realistic Crucifix, placing before the eyes of men and women not the Victorious King but the Sufferer, has, like a mighty magnet, drawn men and women and swept away the more ancient form in common use just because, since Christ the Eternal Word Incarnate died on Calvary, man can realize as he never could before that self-sacrifice—the capacity for suffering—is, dare we say, woven not only into the very heart of man but into the life of God. The realistic Crucifix opens out to us the Heart of God Himself.

But the realistic Crucifix has not only won the heart of man because it has opened out depths in the heart of God, but because it has such fine thoughts for men and women who are sufferers. In times of suffering we all naturally crave for sympathy, but we may well try and realize what sympathy involves. We talk rather loosely in common life of sympathy, we are inclined to muddle up sympathy with mere pity. Perhaps we should not write *mere* pity, for pity is valuable and from pity flows many a gracious deed. But actually at the root of sympathy, if it be true, is common experience. Today we turn our minds to the great problem of slum clearance; many pity those who have to live under such conditions, and from that pity is flowing a great stream of help, but, as a fact, sympathy can only be given by those who have lived in a slum. During the Great War when the telegram came to the poor mother whose boy had been killed on the battlefield, the whole street might pity, but it was only the mother in the street who had gone through the same experience who could give to the broken-hearted mother sympathy. As the years pass on and men reach the tableland of life and then begin the journey downhill, no doubt with many there is the joyful experience of a growing usefulness to others; the experience of life—its joys and sorrows—giving to men and women a greater capacity for sympathy, the great power to rejoice with them that do rejoice and to weep with them that weep. Such thoughts seem to lead us up to another reason why the realistic Crucifix has won its way into the heart of man.

We must tread warily as we write and speak on this matter. Those who were brought up under Bishop Westcott will remember (unless the writer's memory fails him) that the great teacher used to love to speak of a "Divine Must" and a "Divine Cannot." But we dare not speak or write hastily of either what God must do or cannot do. It would be a theological error to assert that before the Incarnation and the Passion God could not feel for—sympathize with man. The writer is now writing of the appeal of the realistic Crucifix to human sufferers,

and what he would try and lead his readers to realize is just this—that the realistic Crucifix draws men's hearts to God because it seems to say that that which must have been so hard for men to grasp, that He who is adored as "Holy! Holy! Holy!" can sympathize with men, is brought within the grasp of heart and mind. We dare not say that before Bethlehem and Calvary God could not sympathize with man in his sufferings; we do say that because of Bethlehem and Calvary we now can realize that God can sympathize with us. Bethlehem and Calvary both must be remembered. The reality of our Lord's humanity is so important. If He took no human personality He took our nature—body and soul. It was no small matter when the Church had to fight against those who denied the truth of the humanity—true Man as well as true God. The Incarnation and the Atonement must never be divided. The Cradle and the Cross must ever be together.

Many years ago Father Bull was preaching at one of the great midday services at St. Paul's. It was Passiontide. He told a touching story of a dying soldier—a mere lad—lying out on the veldt, and Father Bull was with him. Before the boy's eyes he held up the Crucifix and he heard the young lad say: "Father, His sufferings were greater than mine." Did that mean that the lad felt instinctively, because of that Crucifix, the real sympathy of God?

A suffering world today looks at the realistic Crucifix and finds there the lovely message of the sympathy of God. There is need, however, of a word of warning. It may be that some of my readers will remember that great film "The Kingdom," in which they saw a representation of the Passion of Christ. Did they not feel (I would ask) how contrary it was to the canonical gospels? True, perhaps, in detail, but so different in its tone. It could not be otherwise. It could not but stress the physical sufferings, while it is quite clear that the sacred evangelists never stress the physical—the physical must not be stressed at the expense of the spiritual. The realistic Crucifix, though it wins the hearts of men, has its dangers. Human pain and suffering are most real things, but we must ever remember and bear in mind that the appeal is full and rich because of the perfect Humanity. It must ever be realized that God knows what human pain, not only of body but of soul, is, not only by the power of His Omniscience but also from experience. He knows it from within and not only from without. Something should be said on that line, but the writer feels that he is writing on deep mysteries and that he should write—to use the words of the Eucharistic hymn—"with awe and trembling."

In one of Dr. Hort's books there is a rather wonderful passage which leads us to the last line of thought we may take in answering the question why the realistic Crucifix has such a mighty attraction. As a rule, when we pray for the departed we ask for them "light, peace, rest, refreshment." There is within the hearts of many men a kind of shrinking from any idea of pain in the Beyond. Hort bids men feel that we have no right to banish the thought of pain and suffering from the other world. He says that as we look around us and see how great a place pain takes in this life in developing character, we have no right to say that there is no pain there. The writer believes that he is correct in saying that the words of the Apocalypse—"there shall be no more pain"—must be linked with the thought of Heaven only and the Church triumphant. It is clear that Hort meant that as we pass to the other world undeveloped, we must not rule out pain as playing its part in the Beyond in preparation for the "portion of the Saints." Now I would ask my readers to bear Dr. Hort's words in mind in connection with the realistic Crucifix; the Epistle to the Hebrews does not only represent the Passion in its aspect of the great Sacrifice for the sins of men, but as part and parcel of that perfecting of the Son of Man "made perfect by suffering." It is mysterious. Many people do not seem to realize the "perfecting" of Christ, they are so inclined to mix up imperfection with sin. The ideas are no doubt difficult to express in English. I believe the New Prayer Book tries to render the idea by putting unperfect for imperfect in Psalm 139: "Thine eyes did see my substance yet being unperfect." When we use our minds to think of the "Perfect Man" in Heaven, we should remember that the path to that perfection was the path of suffering. There are many reasons why this realistic Crucifix, looked at in this way, has very important lessons for the age in which our lot is cast. We live in an age which is very sensitive as to suffering. The aim of many is to eliminate pain and suffering from human life. Pain is regarded as a great evil to be cut out. But is this aim good? Are we not far too much inclined to be too hedonistic? If the Christ Himself, in whom we see humanity in its perfection, was made perfect by suffering, to eliminate pain and suffering from human life would be bad. The realistic Crucifix with its Suffering Christ and not Victorious King is of immense value to our age. It reveals to us the golden lining of the cloud of pain and suffering—Christ made perfect by suffering, those who suffer with Him will reign with Him in glory. Pain and suffering have their true part to play in the education of humanity—they must not be looked upon simply as punitive. Is it not for that reason

that, although the symbolic Crucifix of the Victorious King is treasured by Christian men as soldiers inspiring them with hope, it is the realistic Crucifix which wins its way so deeply into our hearts with its messages of God and human pain and suffering?

J. LEONARD BOULDEN.

MISCELLANEA

CORRESPONDENCE

DEAR MR. EDITOR,

Your note on p. 228 of THEOLOGY, October, 1934, No. 172, is interesting in what it implies. But first notice two things:

(i.) The note is editorial, Dr. Williams is not responsible for the statements—that is made clear by the (Ed.) at the end.

(ii.) The editor of THEOLOGY is an acknowledged expert in history. The note tells us:

(*a*) The Faith Press is perhaps the oldest publishing body in Europe. It was in full operation in 1290, and as that was about two centuries before Caxton, the Press must have had an army of scribes to supply books for its customers.

(*b*) The S.S.J.E. must be the oldest society of monks in the Church of England. Its continuous life from anterior to 1290 to the present day is an argument for the continuity of the Church of England through the Reformation period to the present.

(*c*) What is called Modernism is certainly not "new" (the note tells us that it has a history of at least 644 years), and probably was not new in 1290.

(*d*) The S.S.J.E. has a long history as a champion of orthodoxy.

These are surely very interesting deductions from the fact stated in the note.

There are perhaps two things which may invalidate the accuracy of the deductions:

(i.) The printer made a mistake—it is unbelievable that the editor did.

(ii.) The proof-reader missed a mistake.

It is difficult to think either of these can be true in the case of such a journal as THEOLOGY.

Yours apologetically,

HENRY

(*Bishop of New Guinea*).

ANGLICAN MISSION,
SAMARAI, PAPUA,
January 5, 1935.

The missionary bishops are men whom the Church delights to honour. They must be allowed to have their little joke. And this time the editorial withers are well and truly wrung. We sadly acknowledge that there was in the note referred to not only the error for which apology was made in the subsequent number, but another which, so far as we know, the Bishop of New Guinea on the other side of the globe has been the first to discover. *N.B.*—There are doubtless many others who also saw it, but they need not all trouble to write and say so. One will be enough. The fact is that 1290 should have been 1920. But after all what is 630 years? See Psalm xc. 4, the text by which certain Jewish Rabbis explained the apparent contradiction between Genesis ii. 17 and Genesis v. 5.—(Ed.).

NOTES

THE ELECTION OF ST. MATTHIAS

THE greatest break in the history of the Apostolic Church is veiled from our eyes. How did the society of Galilæans following Jesus, of whom we read in the Synoptic Gospels, come to leave the neighbourhood of the Lake and turn into a community with its centre at Jerusalem? We have no clue to the causes, though we may plausibly surmise that the primitive Church expected the return of the Messiah to take place at Jerusalem. Anything that throws light on these very early days deserves the closest attention. Clearly the stories in the opening chapters of the Acts, dating in their present form from thirty or forty years after the events they relate, cannot be taken as historical evidence without a careful study of each and a weighing of the internal evidence—of external corroboration there is none.

The story of Matthias is often dismissed by critical writers as legendary. Its association with the account of the death of Judas, which cannot be reconciled with that found in St. Matthew (xxvii. 3-10), helps to cast suspicion on its veracity. A careful study of its details may therefore be welcome. Disregarding the opening verses of St. Peter's speech, let us begin with Acts i. 21, translating as literally as possible.

It is necessary therefore that of the men who went with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out as our head—beginning from the baptism of John until the day that he was taken up from us—that one of these should become a witness with us of his resurrection. The "necessity" is connected with the promise of Matt. xix. 28: "In the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." The critical theories regarding the Apostolate as a later fabrication are hard to maintain in the light of so obviously primitive a saying. The choice was confined to those who had both been continual companions of the disciples during the ministry and had been vouchsafed a vision of the Risen Lord. Barsabbas and Matthias, therefore, belonged to the wider circle of followers from whom the Twelve were chosen, and had doubtless gone up with the Galilæan pilgrims to the final Passover. The *terminus a quo* was John's teaching of repentance and baptism; compare x. 37: "beginning from Galilee, after the baptism which John preached": the *terminus ad quem* was the Resurrection and Ascension. By an undesigned coincidence the limits defined by St. Peter are those of St. Mark, the Petrine Gospel. No stress need be laid on the absence of the Nativity stories in St. Mark. All that can fairly be deduced from this is that St. Peter for the purpose of testimony admitted nothing that he could not support from personal experience. The twelfth Apostle must be one who had known Jesus in the flesh so well that his identification of Him when risen was of value.

And they put forward two, Joseph called Barsabbas, who was surnamed Justus, and Matthias. And they prayed and said* . . . "They" is apparently the whole body of disciples, 120 in number. The word used† appears also in vi. 6, where the community as a whole, invited in *v.* 3 to look out seven men, to be appointed by the Apostles, put Stephen and

* A Roman name; *cf.* John *Mark*, Saul *Paul*.

† ἔστησαν.

the rest before them. The incident here has no bearing on questions of Church government. The existence of these two—perhaps only they were qualified—was a matter of fact. The choice was left to heaven. The prayer is that of the community, led presumably by Peter.

"*Thou, Lord, who knowest the hearts of all, shew of these two which* one *thou hast chosen, to receive the place in this ministry* and apostleship, from which Judas fell away, that he might go to his own place.*" *And they gave lots for them; and the lot fell upon Matthias; and he was numbered with the eleven apostles.* The word for "knowest the hearts" (καρδιογνώστης) recurs in xv. 8, where it refers to God. If this is the meaning here, we shall be tempted to associate the prayer with the Church of Rome, for which perhaps the Acts was written, since the resemblance to the structure of the Western Collect is unmistakable. First comes God's name; then an attribute, on which the prayer is based; then the petition; finally a "that" clause.† The "Western" text has a slightly different reading (αὐτῶν for αὐτοῖς), which alters the sense substantially, since "lot" (κλῆρος) need no longer be taken literally, and we get the meaning: "they gave their votes; and the vote fell upon Matthias; and he was associated with the eleven apostles."

The alternative exposition is clearly better. "Lord" (κύριε) means "Lord Jesus," as frequently in the Third Gospel and elsewhere in the Acts (i. 6, vii. 60, ix. 5, 10, 13, etc.). The disciples who have just said "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to heaven?" speaking to the glorified Master present to the eyes of faith, address Him again as Lord, as they realize His presence. That He knew the hearts of all was a matter of experience, though the dignified compound used by St. Luke is drawn from the Greek Old Testament. They ask their Master to shew by some visible sign whom He has chosen; they have no doubt that He has chosen one of the two as definitely as He chose the original Twelve. It is a beautiful example of true prayer, which strives to know God's will and to be identified with it, not to bend God to human desires. Their prayer is addressed to the Lord and Friend who until a few days ago had been there to resolve every difficulty. There is nothing theological in it; everything is natural and human, but none the less this is the bridge over which the Church passed in order to pray to Christ as God.

The lots are consistent with this attitude of mind. Urim and Thummim were used in the campaigns of the early Hebrews, in order to reach decisions believed to be those of Yahweh (see 1 Samuel xiv. 41, the original text preserved in the LXX). By the time of Elisha, the inspiration of the prophet had taken the place of the primitive lots (2 Kings iii. 15). When prophets ceased in Israel, lots came to their own again; Luke i. 9 reminds us of the part they played in the temple ceremonial. So there was no thought of an appeal to chance; rather God was deemed to shew His will in this way. Immediately afterwards St. Luke tells of the descent of the Holy Ghost and the fulfilment of the promise that "your sons and your daughters shall prophesy." Henceforward the Apostles relied on the insight into the divine Will given by the Spirit and lots ceased.

The story interpreted in this way is so simple and natural that no

* διακονίας. Note that there is here a kind of undifferentiated ministry, out of which "deacons" and the later "apostles" may have grown.

† *Cf.* the Collect for Trinity VI.: "O God,/who hast prepared for them . . .:/ pour into our hearts such love towards thee,/that we . . ." But "that" in Acts i. 25 is not strictly a parallel.

other explanation seems necessary. The parallel to the Western Collect is interesting, but proves nothing, for a similar construction of prayers is found in Wisdom ix. 1-4 and 2 Macc. i. 24-26.

As is well known, the doctrine of heavenly intercessors was held by the Jews. Jeremiah xv. 1, for instance, implies it: "Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my mind could not be toward this people." It is taught clearly in 2 Macc. xv. 12, where Onias is seen "with outstretched hands invoking blessings on the whole body of the Jews." We do not doubt that this doctrine prepared the way for the Church's belief in the intercession of Christ and for the offering of prayers "through Jesus Christ our Lord." But for the origin of prayers to the exalted Christ we need look no further than the practice of the first disciples, who continued to speak to the Lord Jesus in their midst as they had spoken to Him during the ministry. And the story of Matthias gives us a precious proof of this. The whole incident fits the surroundings so perfectly, and is so unlike what later legend would have concocted, that we may accept it as historical without violating any canon of critical investigation.*

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

MODERN MORALITY†

Romans i. 28: "And even as they refused to have God in their knowledge, God gave them up to a reprobate mind."

"It's such rot doing things you don't like because other people do them or want you to do them." In these words the young lady in Rose Macaulay's satirical novel *Crewe Train* outlines her simple philosophy of life. And she speaks for a good many young ladies today. It is, of course, a commonplace that the present generation is in revolt against mere social conventions and traditional moral restrictions. This revolt is most obvious in the sphere of the family. In fact, what most people mean by morality is sexual morality; and in that limited sense I take the term this morning.

It is easy, no doubt, to exaggerate both the novelty and the extent of this revolt. There have always been rebels, and the rebels have seldom been so original as they believed themselves to be. Nevertheless, I believe that a number of factors, intellectual, economic, and social, have conspired within this last generation to produce a critical, even a contemptuous attitude towards traditional morality which is new, even if it is not entirely without parallel, in the history of civilization.

As to the extent of this revolt, I suppose that you, living in Liverpool, are in some respects better qualified to judge of the facts than I, living in a religious house, and judging of them mainly, though not entirely, from contemporary literature, scientific and otherwise. On the other hand, the average citizen is apt to base his, or her, judgment almost entirely upon experience of his, or her, immediate social environment

* The appearance "to the twelve" in 1 Cor. xv. 5 has been held to invalidate the story of Judas and Matthias. But if Christ appeared to the Eleven, and also to Barsabbas and Matthias, and Matthias presently became one of the Twelve, the inexactness becomes trifling.

† An address given in Liverpool Parish Church on November 21, 1934, by the Rev. Fr. Stephen Bedale, S.S.M.

(*i.e.*, his or her friends and acquaintances); whereas those who write books and "Reports" upon the subject have studied the facts deliberately over a wide area. And certainly their account of things is sufficiently startling, and, to an old-fashioned mind at least, shocking. Thus, a recent observer of the birth-rate in Germany (Julius Wolf, cited in Russell: *Marriage and Morals*) estimates that 600,000 abortions are effected annually in Germany; and it is suggested that the facts are not really so very different in England. As for America—listen to this: "The destruction of the family and the Church (and they are inseparable) is not coming in the United States like a Russian revolution. . . . The boys and girls engaged in this peaceful revolution can be found anywhere from Texas to Maine, from Hollywood to New York. . . . They no longer see things through the eyes of the family. . . . Father is no longer a hero to his son, and the minister has disappeared almost altogether. . . . 'Virtue,' 'purity,' in the old sense, rarely exist, and are not even considered desirable" (Dr. J. B. Watson, in the *New Generation*).

"Impossible!" you exclaim. "Or, at least, grossly exaggerated." Very probably, I should think. But please observe that you have not been listening to the diatribe of some old-fashioned moralist, raising his lament over the decay of primitive virtue, but to the song of triumph of Dr. John B. Watson, an eminent American psychologist of the *Behaviourist* school, celebrating the emancipation of humanity from tradition and priestly superstition. He goes on to look forward to a Golden Age when man will be entirely free to satisfy his immediate impulses, or, as Dr. Watson prefers to put it, his "conditioned reflexes." "There will be," he says, "there is coming to be now, a great sex freedom among adolescents. This is a return to the practice of primitive tribes and is in line with the behaviour of other primates." Which, done into plain English, signifies "the practice of South Sea islanders and the behaviour of the monkey-house."

I do not think the animalism of Dr. J. B. Watson need detain us as a theory. It is necessary to remember that the Cardinal Virtues of Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance were not invented by Moses or by St. Paul. They were not invented by anyone, except God the Word. They are just fundamental, and, the Trobriand islanders notwithstanding, universal intuitions of the essential character of human nature and human life. It is as futile to ignore them as to ignore the human habit of thinking that twice two makes four. Certainly you can't prove it; but, then, does it need proof? The point will, I feel sure, become clear if we leave for a moment the consideration of continence and turn to the sister virtue of fortitude. Fortitude concerns the discipline of the animal instinct of self-preservation and the harmonizing of its impulses with other impulses arising from higher and wider considerations, so that a truly human or "moral" behaviour results. When I was a boy we used to be told one of the great stories of the sea, the sinking of the troopship *Birkenhead*. We heard how the women and children were placed in the few boats available, while the troops fell in on deck and went to their death standing at attention with all the ceremony of the parade-ground. And as we listened we exclaimed, not simply because we were Christians, but ultimately because we were human: "How fine!" And we may observe, as against a certain ingenious misinterpretation of the facts, that when we said, "How fine!" we *meant* not, "How

fine it makes us feel!" but, "How fine it was!" We did homage to fortitude. And then, the other day, we all read of another disaster at sea. But in this case we read of passengers too drunk to get out of their berths, of bridge officers running about in hysteria, and of a crew who took to the boats and left their charges to burn. And, as we read, I doubt not that we all shuddered—not at the pain of it, but at the shame. Yet, after all, those poor creatures were only, in Dr. Watson's phrase, bringing their conduct into line with the behaviour of other primates. That is more or less exactly, I suppose, how a shipload of monkeys would have behaved in the circumstances.

"But," someone may ask, "is it not the case that reputable psycho-analysts today advocate an attitude towards the free expression of the sex instinct essentially similar to that of Dr. Watson?" That notion is widespread, but it is a mistaken one, and rests largely upon a persistent misunderstanding of Freud's somewhat peculiar use of the term "repression"—a term which, in his use, does not refer to any conscious and deliberate process of discipline, but to an unconscious refusal on the part of the mind to face unwelcome truths. There is not time to argue that statement this morning, but here is Freud's own verdict upon sexual or any other kind of licence: "Free living is itself a repression"—that is, it frustrates and crushes into unconsciousness the truly human part of our nature. What Freud has really called attention to is not the harmfulness of deliberate, conscious discipline and control of the passions, but the dangers of the unconscious self-deception which often results from prudery, vanity, or fear; and to those dangers, as consulting-room records would shew, I believe, the emancipated bright young thing of today is, on the whole, more liable than the orthodox Catholic, who has been taught to examine his conscience and to accept as a platitude that the "heart of man is desperately wicked and deceitful above all things." Before I leave this point, which is really important, let me reinforce it by a reference to another authority, Dr. McDougall, a psychologist of international reputation with a large practical experience in psycho-therapy. He makes it clear (*cf. Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 215 *ff.*) that he has never known any moral conflict, however prolonged and severe, result in neurosis apart from "repression." That is, if you fight out your temptations, in the daylight and unafraid, you may find the process wearing, but you will not "break down" under it.

We need not, then, take seriously any suggestion that we ought, or can, have done with all discipline and restraint in the realm of sex. Nevertheless, there is today a very widespread complaint that the demands made by traditional Christian morality are too heavy for human nature to bear, and that natural scientists, as the high priests of this generation, ought to lay down for us a new law. And it must be admitted that some of them are not backward to answer the appeal or unduly diffident of their ability to do so. Between them, they are rapidly evolving a body of teaching upon sex expression for which they claim that it is strictly rational and scientific, and free from every taint of tradition and superstition.

As a fair example of this New Morality we might, perhaps, take Bertrand Russell's book *Marriage and Morals*. In it he argues that, to promote the happiness of mankind, it is first essential to relieve men's minds of all idea of "sin" in connection with the expression of the sex instinct, whatever the expression it finds. And then we must take

full advantage both of the scientific invention of contraceptives, and of the extended functions of the modern State, in order to divorce the responsible business of parenthood from the individual gratification of sex appetite. Both these things are to be recognized as desirable ends in themselves but not as necessarily related. Parenthood, he argues, concerns the State, and should be regulated and subsidized by the State. Only a union which results in children should be recognized by the State and, in any degree, regarded as permanent. Other unions, whether temporary or merely promiscuous, provided only that they do not result in offspring, might be freely contracted by married and unmarried alike without condemnation. In this way the individual should be set free to seek his own happiness by the fullest and freest expression of his erotic personality, while the State interfered only to safeguard the rights of whatever children were born. Other writers produce variations on the same theme—the essence of it all being that the satisfaction of the sex-desire can, and should, be dissociated from begetting children, in order that the individual, married or not, may be at liberty to pursue his own sexual pleasure wherever he may find it.

Now as to this New Scientific Morality, we must first observe that it is, in essence, neither new nor scientific. It is not "scientific" because it cannot be. Natural science is concerned with what is, or what can be; it is not, as such, concerned with what ought to be. It is perfectly true that science has made it possible to divorce parenthood from sex love; it has also made it possible to drench cities with poison gas; but whether such things *should* be done is another question, to be argued on other grounds, and there the opinion of the scientist, as such, is worth exactly as much or as little as that of any other individual.

Neither is it new, for at root it assumes a moral theory which has been advocated only to be condemned these 2,000 years and more under the name of Hedonism—the theory that the only real motive and rational determinant of human conduct is the securing of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Sometimes the word happiness is substituted for pleasure, and then the theory sounds, and is, more respectable, but hardly less fallacious. It would be unfair to suggest that Lord Russell, in pleading for "Free Love," is pleading merely for sensuality. His own ideas of love appear to be strongly tinged with the romantic. But in whatever guise the theory is presented, it remains true that happiness or pleasure is assumed to be an end-in-itself to be consciously pursued—and the *only* end. And the theory is psychologically false; therefore practically self-defeating. Psychologically false, because we are not so constituted as to desire and pursue *pleasure*, but so as to desire and to pursue *objects*. Practically self-defeating, because, as all experience shews, the self-conscious pursuit of pleasure results in boredom, and the one sure way of missing happiness is to worry about whether one is happy or not. Men find happiness when they forget themselves in their work, in the pursuit of some worthy purpose, in the performance of some unselfish service, in the care of some loved person; and the pursuit of such ends inevitably entails, in greater or less degree, the voluntary acceptance of pain and discipline, perhaps even the final self-sacrifice of death. In the pursuit of their own sensations men find tedium and disgust; in the pursuit of their own happiness, despair.

Lord Russell would relieve man of the "sense of sin" in regard to sex. It does not occur to him, apparently, that to do that is much the

same thing as to relieve him of the sense of its sacredness, its dignity, its real significance. Others, more materialistically minded, insist that sex is a purely physiological function; and that is to make it as uninteresting as other purely physiological functions to which we do not generally refer in public. To divorce sex love from the responsibilities of parenthood, the discipline, sacrifice, give and take of home duties which, in God's purpose, it inspires men and women to undertake and sustains them in performing, is to make parenthood dull and love mere self-indulgence (*Cf.* Walter Lippman, *Preface to Morals*).

The proof of these things is in life. I am not suggesting that very many men and women today are consciously acquainted with and acting upon the moral theories I have outlined. Rather, the actual practice of many men and women is what such theories seek to justify. They seek "Happiness." Do they find it? Certainly if modern fiction of the serious order correctly reflects modern life, then modern life is a pretty low-spirited affair. Whatever else one may think of the creatures of the modern novelist's erotic sensibility, one can hardly describe them as radiantly happy. And if anyone would pursue to its very bitter end this dream of a world ordered upon the sole principle of eliminating pain and moral conflict, while ignoring all moral values, let him read Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. I do not pretend to know with what purpose the author wrote this brilliantly unpleasant book; but I cannot imagine a more effectual emetic for a mind suffering from a surfeit of scientific utilitarianism.

In conclusion, a few words about what I believe to be the Church's task in the face of this moral confusion. Not, I think, simply to promote repressive legislation. A modicum of external moral control there must always be. No State can tolerate complete moral anarchy; and the Church, in the interests of her own purity, must always exercise a certain discipline over her own members. But history shews how ineffective is legislation which does not express the general conscience of the day—we have not yet forgotten Prohibition. And theology explains that "Law" does not, in itself, avail to make men saints. It is rather for the Church to point men to *chastity* as to a positive ideal, commending it, not as a dismal duty, but as a high adventure, wherein human nature rises above the animals, and its powers are consecrated to a supernatural end. Lust is bad just because it renders a man progressively incapable, psychologically incapable, of love. Lust is undignified, because it is essentially infantile, and those that pursue it never really "grow up" on one side of their nature.

But, above all, the Church's task today is to recall men's minds to a living faith in the living God. Not simply to appeal to His Will as to the fiat of some celestial tyrant; but to preach the Gospel of His Creative and Redemptive Purpose for human life, revealed in Christ Jesus, progressively unfolded in all human history. For, when all is said, the fundamental characteristic of modern morality is its essential Godlessness. It is the morality of men who cannot believe that there is any real purpose in human life, or, at least, no greater purpose than our human purposes; and these they know to be, at best, half-blind, and, at last, futile. For, seen from the necessarily (and for its purposes rightly) limited standpoint of natural science, human life upon this planet is only an incident in the cooling down of a vast nebula, destined to vanish as it came and leave no trace. So regarded, what does it matter, anyway? Obviously

nothing really matters at all unless it matters *eternally*. "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die." But if through faith we know that our little human lives are caught up into the vast eternal purpose of an intelligent and loving Creator, that our human acts subserve, or may subserve, that purpose, then our lives have dignity and our acts have significance, and we desire to behave as men who know it and live to the "glory of God."

There is no need for us to be hypercritical of our neighbours. We know, or should know, well enough our own weakness; know, perhaps, how halting and inconsistent has been our allegiance to our "Lady Chastity." There is, then, no call for the sharp-nosed, thin-lipped censoriousness, which commonly means that a man is condemning in the person of another the base desires which he dare not discover in himself. But we will not sell our birthright for a mess of pottage. If one believes that there is no essential difference between a man and a monkey—why, it is not surprising that the man should behave like the monkey. But *we* believe that we are made in the image of God; that Jesus Christ His only Son is our type and forerunner; that our citizenship is in heaven. And if in a time of doubt and confusion Christian men and women hold fast by Faith to their vocation and build Christian homes to the glory of God, the world may very well be left to mark the results and to judge for itself which is the way of Death, and which the way of Life.

STEPHEN BEDALE, S.S.M.

THE LORD'S SUPPER IN THE REFORMED CHURCH OF HOLLAND

THE following account is taken from a letter from a correspondent in Holland, Mr. K. H. L. van Selms, *apropos* of the description of the Dutch reformed service in Dr. Brilioth's *Eucharistic Faith and Practice*:

"Dr. Brilioth says (p. 184): 'In Holland, the basis of the whole liturgical tradition was, and still is, the rite composed by Joh. à Lasco in 1550 for Dutch refugees in England.' As a matter of fact, the Dutch Church in London was of great importance for the Church in Holland, being the first organization of the Dutch Reformed people; and we can find traces of the Forms composed by à Lasco in some Forms still in use in our Church, which were translated into Dutch and approved between 1570 and 1580, when our people won their freedom from the oppression of Spain and the Inquisition. But for the most part our Forms are translations from the rites used at Geneva and Rhenpfalz. In particular, our 'Form for the Administration of the Holy Supper' is a close and literal translation from that of Rhenpfalz, of which Dr. Brilioth gives a good description on p. 184; apart from two or three small changes, the main difference is that at the breaking of the bread and the taking of the chalice the Form of à Lasco is followed.

"In spite of the words of the Form and of Article 35 of the *Confessio Belgica* (the so-called 37 Articles, often compared with the English 39 Articles, but less anti-Roman and more positive-Reformed), the service has been regarded by most Dutchmen only as a commemoration of the

Passion and Death of our Lord; spiritual life in Holland has always been influenced from abroad, and in particular still shews the marks of the eighteenth-century Quietism and Pietism. Since it is thus treated as a commemoration, the chief and most important administration of the Lord's Supper is that of Good Friday evening; and since about 1800 most Dutch Protestants, except some Old Calvinistic groups, have kept Good Friday as a holiday, on which as little work as possible is done, so that the people may prepare for a worthy reception of the Communion. The other days on which it is celebrated are as a rule the first Sundays in January, July, and October.

"After the usual beginning of the service with a psalm (hymn), the *Votum* ('In the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost'—which hallows a collection of people to be a body of believers), the *Greet* ('Grace be unto you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, through the Holy Ghost' (1 Cor. i. 3), or else Rev. i. 4*b*-5*a*, or else the old *Adjutorium*: 'Our help is in the Name of the Lord, who hath made heaven and earth, who will be faithful for ever and will not despise the works of His own hands'), the minister starts immediately with the order of the service according to the prescribed Form; there is no sermon, only sometimes a short address. The Form is, in large churches, read from the pulpit; but when possible, and therefore mostly in the smaller churches, it is read from behind the Table. When the Exhortation has been read and the prayers and the Apostles' Creed, the people sing a Psalm, such as xxiii., lxxxiv., cxvi., or cxxx., or a communion hymn; during this the minister (*episcopos*), assisted by two deacons (*diakonoi*—a very remarkable survival; for it is not the elders who assist, as Dr. Brilioth says), prepares the Table, taking away the white cloth with which the elements have hitherto been covered, and filling the chalices. When he is ready and the singing has ended, he says the Invitation: 'Come, for all things are now ready' (Luke xiv. 17). When all are seated he takes some bread, which has been cut in 'ropes' before the service, from the big plate, he breaks it and puts it on two plates, one for the people on the right, one for those on the left, saying: 'The bread which we break is the communion of the body of Christ; take, eat, remember, and believe that the body of our Lord Jesus Christ was broken for us as a perfect atonement (*volkommene Versöhnung*) for all our sins'; and with his right hand blessing the chalices he says: 'The cup of thanksgiving which we bless with thanksgiving is the communion of the blood of Christ; take, drink ye all of it, remember, and believe that the precious blood of our Lord Jesus Christ was shed as a perfect atonement for all our sins' (this is the passage from à Lasco alluded to above). When all have received the Bread, he passes round the two (or four) chalices. After the communion he reads, standing at the Table (not in the pulpit, as Dr. Brilioth says), a short passage from the Bible, such as Isaiah liii. or from John vi. or xiv.-xvii. Then a verse of a hymn is sung, during which the deacons collect at the ends of the Table the plates and the chalices, to bring them back to the minister; the communicants go back to their places, and others come to the Table.

"The liturgical revival now taking place in Holland (see the relevant chapter in *Northern Catholicism*) has created a greatly deepened interest in the Lord's Supper, much more than there was, for instance, fifteen years ago; and last summer our Synod appointed a Committee to revise the form of our liturgy, and it is to be expected that it will incorporate

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Dr. Thomas Coke, who died at sea in 1814, is commemorated by a tablet in the Priory Church (now the Cathedral) of Brecon, where he lived as a boy. He was a truly pious and unambitious man, and, although placed in a false position by the birth of the Methodist Episcopal Church in America, as a result of his ministry there, he tried to rectify his position and heal the schism into which he had been led, by seeking valid consecration from the Anglican Episcopate. In fact, as a missioner and evangelist, he was another St. Chad, but he was unable to find, as St. Chad did, an Archbishop Theodore to complete and make valid his office as Bishop in the Church of God. Justice has not been done to Coke's memory, and the best memorial to him would be the union he himself desired of the Methodist Episcopal Church with the Anglican Episcopate in the United States.

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ARTHUR P. LANCEFIELD.

REVIEWS

CHURCH AND STATE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By Norman Sykes. Cambridge University Press. 21s.

"It would be difficult," said Dr. Hort, "to insist too strongly on the transformation of the superficial aspects of numerical authority effected by recognition of Genealogy." The remark is true not only of textual phenomena but of historical statements. Somebody formulates a verdict, lurid or sombre, of a man or of a period. It passes from lip to lip, from book to book, till at last it is generally accepted, because everyone says it and it is in all the books. But it is only the verdict, possibly mistaken, of one person. The eighteenth century has been a sufferer from this bad habit. We hand on disparaging statements about Hoadley and Watson, and even about Warburton and Hurd, without that verification which is the price of accuracy. And yet, as Wordsworth says:

> True dignity abides with him alone
> Who in the patient hour of silent thought
> Can still suspect, and still revere himself.

Professor Sykes has the true dignity. In this most remarkable book he suspects himself whenever he is tempted lightly to endorse conventional verdicts, and he reveres his own knowledge of original authorities. If the disparaging tradition had never become current, we imagine it would have given him considerable satisfaction to be a pioneer in the work of putting the eighteenth century in its proper place. For he has a nice gift of irony, and he enjoys using it. Thus he writes in his introductory chapter: "During the reign of Charles II. the pressure of the inconsistency whereby the Supreme Governor of the Church was an apostate from its communion was eased by the circumstances that the restored monarch was by nature a *politique* who would not hazard his crown for any adventure of politics or religion." Even as it is, in his chapter, at once fascinating and nauseating, on "The Ladder of Preferment," he again and again most dexterously describes the manœuvring for position which was practised by deans, prebendaries and the holders of "little bishoprics," in the kind of language which they might quite seriously have used themselves to put the best face on their importunity, if they had been ingenious enough to think of it. In so far as he finds it necessary, he has great pleasure in what Sydney Smith called "abating pompous gentlemen with successful ridicule."

Accordingly, the book is far from being a whitewashing of the period. The fact is that exásperated, as a scientific historian, by the dark shadows which some have painted in order to throw up the high light of the Catholic revival, the author has set himself to exhibit a faithful account "alike of the shortcomings and of the real achievement of the Hanoverian prelacy," and, it may be added, of the other clergy and of the laity of that age. His view is that the eighteenth-century condition of the Church was an inheritance, which was further shaped and depressed by the circumstances of the time. There had been Watsons in the seventeenth century, and indeed the Hanoverian régime was in many respects a legacy from the Middle Ages, without the advantages which the mediæval bishops enjoyed of having assistants available to replace them while they were engaged in State affairs. The absenteeism of bishops from their dioceses, except for the summer visit, and the rarity of Visitation and Confirmation tours, were due to the universal assumption that the House of Lords had the first claim on their time, and to the real difficulties of travelling. Such Confirmation tours as were undertaken were almost always very laborious. The place-seeking, which seems so odious, becomes not indeed either inevitable or praiseworthy, but intelligible when we remember the grave inequality of payments. Durham was worth twelve times as much as Oxford, and Ely more than seven times as much as Bristol.

This inequality was remorselessly exploited by the Government, and for the most part with success. In the matter of using to advantage the man-power of the Church, the reign of Sir Robert Walpole was the Golden Age. He sometimes enjoyed the felicity of finding all his bishops voting on his side. In 1733, when there was a reverberation of the dangerous question of the South Sea Company and he was saved by a solid episcopal vote, he was advised by a contemporary versifier to

> Consider the Ch. is your rock of defence;
> Your South Sea escape in your memory cherish,
> When sinking you cry'd, Help, Lds., or I perish.

But the discipline applied to procure this uniformity was very real. When a bishop was kept a long time in a small see, it was almost always a deliberate punishment for independence. Watson was genuinely independent and suffered accordingly, and if, as is notorious, he provided himself with compensations, it was by no favour of the Government. Hoadley, on the other hand, although he was incapacitated by both unorthodoxy and physical lameness, gave complete satisfaction to the authorities, and was swiftly translated from Bangor to Hereford, from Hereford to Sarum, and from Sarum to Winchester. George

Grenville considered bishoprics as of two kinds: "bishoprics of business for men of abilities and learning, and bishoprics of ease for men of family and fashion." Of the former sort he reckoned Canterbury and York, and London, and Ely on account of its connection with Cambridge; of the latter sort Durham and Winchester, Salisbury and Worcester. But to whichever sort the bishop belonged, there was a great gulf between him and the "inferior clergy." It was accounted an extraordinary thing that Bishop Warburton, before preaching a charity sermon in a London church, was "beyond measure condescending and courteous, and he even graciously handed some biscuits and wine on a salver to the curate who was to read the prayers." Archdeacon Paley, in an ordination sermon, congratulated the rank and file of the clergy on their lowly position, and reminded them that:

> "Being on a level with the greatest part of your parishioners, you gain access to their conversation and confidence, which is rarely granted to the superior clergy without extraordinary address and the most insinuating advances on their parts. And this is a valuable privilege; . . . the right use of it constitutes one of the most respectable employments not only of our order, but of human nature; and leaves you, believe me, little to envy in the condition of your superiors, or to regret in your own."

It was a pedestrian period, of pompous bishops, complacent rectors, starved curates, a good deal of conventional church-going by citizens and villagers, with an ignorant and savage proletariat growing up in the new industrial towns. The preacher did not plead "as a dying man to dying men." He was content to argue that Christianity was the way of sobriety and reasonableness. He did not plumb what Newman called "the dread depths of grace," and neither he nor his hearers attached much importance to tradition. But it was an era of benevolence and of charitable foundations, and there was some real piety. Dr. Johnson's devotions are familiar, but many will be surprised and edified to learn from Dr. Sykes of the prayers of the Duke of Newcastle, twice Prime Minister and for twenty years the chief adviser of the Crown in ecclesiastical affairs, and of his scruples lest his public anxieties should make him unfit for Communion at Christmas, Easter, Whitsuntide and Michaelmas.

Dr. Sykes shews that one of the most flagrant cases of repeating inaccurate statements arises in the matter of the suppression of Convocation. The high-handed action of 1717 (at which actual date it appears that Walpole was not Prime Minister, though in office he had certainly been no friend to the Lower Houses) had a long history behind it. Not many of us know that after Archbishop Sheldon's bargain with the State

in 1664, Convocation, being now less useful than it had been, was suppressed for twenty-four years. As Fuller remarks of Parliament and Convocation at another period: "As it is observed in nature, when one twin is of unusual strength and bigness, the other, his partner born with him, is weak and dwindled away."

There are a number of very interesting character sketches. Among the persons who improve on acquaintance are Herring, Shute Barrington, and White Kennett. Justice is done to Watson's shrewd and independent mind. It is evident that Dr. Sykes would not quite agree with a verdict passed by Macaulay, who wrote on his own copy of the letters from Warburton to Hurd the words: "Bully to Sneak." The book is not a complete history of the century, only a series of studies of the interactions of Church and State. It excludes America, Scotland and Ireland, and it excludes theology, except in so far as theology becomes necessary in order to explain, as is done very clearly, Hoadley's impossible theory of the Church and the more reasonable and indeed very interesting arguments of Warburton and Paley. Thus we do not hear very much of Butler and nothing of Berkeley or Seabury. Even with these limitations, it is a massive and authoritative book, fully and exactly documented, often from unpublished records—*e.g.*, the Wake MSS and the episcopal records of Gloucester, Worcester, Exeter and Llandaff. He has also made large use of various recently published clerical diaries. From now onwards nobody must ever venture an opinion about the eighteenth century who has not considered this book. Among our few regrets about it is the fact that we do not hear anything of Dr. Routh, nor nearly so much as we should like of William Law. Another is that good Bishop Wilson of Sodor and Man, the prelate who would not think of leaving the diocese to which he was wedded because she was poor, does not figure in its pages. But he, though he ordered his own little island State on his own Church lines, and in fact made it into a sort of totalitarian Church, never had much to do with the Great State as it was directed by the lords spiritual and the lords temporal at Westminster.

S. C. CARPENTER.

NATURE, MAN AND GOD. The Gifford Lectures for 1932-1933 and 1933-1934. By William Temple, Archbishop of York. Macmillan. 18s.

This admirable exposition of theism, within the legitimate frontiers of natural theology, is of the highest value equally to Christian thought and to modern philosophy; for its lucid

discussion of essential principles gives these their proper perspective, in the light of the current tendencies towards Realism and Objective or Platonic Idealism. The first aspect is unmistakable. The author's rejection of the Cartesian system as "most disastrous" necessitates the natural world being accepted as indubitably real, not only in itself, but still further as the requisite foundation for the arduous ascent of consciousness to the human level whereon art and knowledge, moral and religious experience, can appear as the distinctive but never dissociated manifestations of self-conscious mind.

This initial standpoint, securely substantiated as it is by modern science, logically involves the correlation of Nature and Mind, not, however, by reducing the latter to the stage of mechanical causation, but rather by insisting that the actual character of Mind expresses itself in steadily expanding control over the natural realm within which it develops. This directive power, again, gradually acquires prevision, deliberation and decision through the unique ability of Mind to generate those potential purposes from which it selects its ideal ends, first of all as mere satisfactions which become, however, radically transmuted into the infinite diversity of the Good. "The more completely, therefore, we include Mind within Nature, the more inexplicable must Nature become except by reference to Mind" (p. 133). In full accordance with all available scientific data, this argument is safeguarded against the insidious temptation to resolve the material world into some type of primitive consciousness. "On the contrary, it is from the reality of matter that we reach the supremacy of spirit" (p. 491), although "the essential difference between mind and matter remains"; and this permits the crucial advance to the "supremacy and absolute freedom of God," in contrast with which "matter exists in full reality but at a secondary level as His creation" (p. 493). Finally, this leads to the concept of Divine Personality as absolutely transcending the universe within which it is, in one sense, immanent.

Dr. Temple's unequivocal emphasis on personality, I believe, is one of the most impressive features of his book. For, undeniably, it is extremely difficult to retain the older estimates of human nature when we regard man, as we must, against the unfathomable abyss of space-time, which renders even the solar system almost negligible. The scale is so overwhelming that, inevitably, we forget that our personality is no more than embryonic, although, on the other hand, the potentialities of selfhood, as such, are limitless; and the author counters these obstacles by marshalling the plain facts of life and history, together with the conclusions of biology and psychology, in

support of his clear analysis of the apparently paradoxical reciprocity between immanence and transcendence. Nor can this paradox be overcome till we perceive that personality alone enjoys the power of transcending its own productions, even while it remains immanent within them. This holds true of man's experience, while for Divine Personality the transcendence becomes absolute and the immanence, in His self-revelation, complete.

This is the more significant because the demand for a transcendent supreme Reality is thoroughly justified by the virtually infinite dimensions of Nature, taken together with its almost infinitesimal delicacy. Nothing less than transcendence will meet the situation; and this has so often been sought in some impersonal or superpersonal being, simply because human nature has been overestimated. Dr. Temple's handling of these intricately interwoven themes should go far to prove that philosophy may, quite logically, associate the concept of personality with that of transcendence. But only, to repeat, as inseparable from immanence; and thus the idea of creation is attained as the perennial relation between God and universe. "The existence of the world is due to the Will of God . . . the essential notion of Creation, and Religion dare not let it go" (p. 37). Even man's freedom can subsist only in submission to the Divine Will, never in opposition.

But obscure though all these problems are, they still remain largely intellectual, while the advance to moral experience confronts thought with the almost intractable dilemma of evil. Quite naturally, the author stresses the tentativeness of his own suggestions. Nevertheless, he seems to myself to have urged all that need be said from the philosophical viewpoint. The complexity of the phenomena necessitates a relevantly complex analysis. In itself, evil is actual and positive, and never a mere negation; yet since utter evil is inconceivable, it must be described as "Negative Value," and as the practically inevitable outcome of the pursuit, by finite minds, of those apparent goods that are never more than approximations to the highest good. The discussion of the legitimacy of ascribing evil to God is excellent; it enables us, without the slightest palliation, to perceive that the world process is always such that evil ultimately becomes "an indispensable element in what, as a whole, is good" (p. 209). And precisely because one of the fullest manifestations of the Divine Will is this triumph over evil, so man's personality gains many of its finest qualities from its struggle with its inherent evil, and in no other possible way.

But this can be so only if our freedom is actual; and here also Dr. Temple's correlation of this truth to the principle of

causation is perfectly valid. Genuine freedom consists in "self-determination in accordance with apparent good" (p. 501), in the sense that while all moral actions remain indubitably causal, they are decided never from without, but from within the self, which thus becomes, so far as its limitations permit, the arbiter of its own conduct, character and destiny; and many scientists will endorse the author's conviction that to seek the foundation of freedom in any principle of indeterminacy "is a disastrous error" (p. 229).

Very few points call for fuller elucidation. I may suggest, however, that mathematics is much more than "the science of Quantity." As Whitehead and Cassirer have shewn, it is just as essentially qualitative; and this affects its description as "occupied with the Timeless." For, as Dr. Temple himself observes, mathematical processes "receive vindication from the behaviour of the world" in such a way that "laws themselves unchanging describe change," while mind itself demands permanence. The purely relational aspects of mathematics, again, find a close parallel in the formal elements of art; and thus the most abstract of sciences may justly claim to share

> The appropriate calm of blest eternity.

We must distinguish between two contrasted types of constancy: first the uniform and repetitive, emphasized by the early stages of research, and secondly the stability, like that of a liner meeting wind and wave, which modern science is handling so successfully as to render Caird's famous dictum increasingly inapplicable, thus steadily relieving the tension between itself, philosophy and religion.

It is somewhat remarkable, also, to find that while the author expresses his indebtedness to Caird and Bosanquet, the great advocates of the Objective Idealism which originates, by way of Hegel, from Plato, he restricts "Idealism" almost completely to the subjectivisms that have usurped the place of this *philosophia perennis*, and then rejects "the errors associated with the term" (p. 497). But the two thinkers mentioned were, like Dr. Temple, realists, while Hegel himself laid ample emphasis on Divine Personality; properly interpreted, Objective Idealism is apparently regaining its ancient and rightful influence. It provides, for instance, much of the background to Whitehead's system, whose limitations in other vital respects are clearly indicated in the present volume.

Space forbids consideration of the many other outstanding themes in the common domain of philosophy, theology and religion. But it must never be forgotten that philosophy seeks understanding, while religion demands worship; and

"Natural Theology ends in a hunger for that Divine Revelation which it began by excluding from its purview" (p. 520). Of this cardinal principle the entire work is a triumph of exposition, instructive to the beginner and illuminating to the specialist. Eloquent without being verbose, and profound without being obscure, it should go far towards securing the recognition of theism as a valid system of thought, and of Christianity as a "reasonable service."

J. E. TURNER.

NOTICES

THE CASE FOR FAITH HEALING. By J. D. Beresford. Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 5s. net.

SPIRITUAL HEALING: A CRITICAL APPRECIATION. By Malcolm Spencer and H. W. Workman. S.C.M. Press. 2s. 6d.

The value of these two books begins with their titles, for those titles serve admirably to draw attention to a distinction which is not always, perhaps not even often, recognized in spite of its importance. Faith healing and spiritual healing are not the same thing. Their common ground is that both deal with non-material methods of helping suffering humanity. But one method seems eventually to seek "curing" while the other seeks "healing"—something which has a deeper and wider scope than the physical circumference of man's being. One stresses the human element, the other the supra-human element. And from this point of view each of these books has a particular value, for in the development of its special theme each book unwittingly emphasizes the distinction to which we have alluded. *The Case for Faith Healing* is an enquiry into the origins of an observed phenomenon and starting from certain premisses, not idealistic philosophy, proceeds more or less along inductive lines. *Spiritual Healing* is a survey of a particular field in which that phenomenon occurs and specifically relates it to the historic faith of the Christian Church.

Mr. Beresford claims that his premisses "are sufficiently inclusive to hold the essential teachings of religion and science," and which "anyone may accept no matter to what Church he belongs" (p. 26). That may be so, but it is not possible to reconcile with the ordinary standards of Christian belief such expressions or inferences as "however great may have been Christ's occult powers . . ." (p. 44); (the Cross) "a symbol of a particular and not of a universal incarnation" (p. 153); "this immortal principle" (the immanent spirit, the true ego) in man can be developed only by his own effort . . . through many incarnations" (p. 178); or the final (and as the author admits, fundamental) difference between his own and the Christian conception of the relation in which man stands to God (p. 180). The authors of *Spiritual Healing* believe, on the other hand, that such healing is an expression of God's will, part of His revelation in the Lord Christ, and therefore capable in the end of being correlated to other aspects of the Divine Will as, *e.g.*, expressed in those natural laws which are the proper subject of scientific investigation.

Both authors feel that the canons of "natural law" as at present known are not broad enough to include this type of healing. Mr. Beresford hopes that a new cosmology based on his premisses would remedy this, for science must take account of actual phenomena, including miracles. Mr. Workman and Mr. Spencer see spiritual healing already included in the law of life which was perfectly manifested in Christ and is to become progressively potent in His body the Church. To them and to those who took part in the Round Table Conference of which this book is a report, spiritual healing is a part of definitely Christian experience, and in the various methods, whether imposition of hands or unction or intercession or mystical union through which the gift is bestowed, they find the expression of one central and vital fact—the present activity of the living and victorious Lord expressing and fulfilling in this particular field the perfect will of God. It is along such lines that science and religion may work together towards a more complete synthesis.

J. R. Pridie.

Spiritual Liberty. By Vernon Storr. S.C.M. 4s. Paper covers, 2s. 6d.

The title-page describes this book as "a Study of Liberal Evangelicalism," and the author not only as Archdeacon of Westminster but also as President of the Anglican Evangelical Group Movement. The book therefore is a semi-official manifesto popular in style and cheap in price.

The Archdeacon first gives a summary of the spirituality of the older evangelicals. He then describes what the new Liberal retains and surrenders of this, the additions that the Liberal makes, and sundry minor accommodations to the outlook of "the average layman." His chapters are headed "Liberty of Inquiry," "Authority in Religion," "The Bible," "The Church," and "Worship." He omits, therefore, specific enquiry into the more spiritual problems of mystic, ascetic and moral theology, which are immensely involved in these changes. He concludes with a confident prophecy of the great future of such a position in the power of an undefined devotion to the Person of Christ.

The book contains loose ends of thought and phrasing. This is due partly to its scope and purpose, but partly also to the nature of Liberal Evangelicalism, as Canon Storr describes it. For instance, the Liberal Evangelical acknowledges "different types of ministry, all equally used of God for the spiritual uplift of His people." But does this mean that all spiritual uplift is equal, or that only those types of ministry are to be acknowledged which can shew an equal standard of uplift? And if the latter, who is to decide the standard and the equality, on which depends the right guidance of souls?

Richard L. Barnes, C.R.

The Meaning of Mass. Dogmatic and Devotional Considerations upon the Divine Liturgy. By the Rev. Bede Frost. Mowbray. 3s. 6d.

We fear that this book will scarcely get a fair hearing. It is a theological exposition (in the true sense of the word theological) of the Roman Mass by an Anglican priest. Romans will not see the book, and Anglicans will be put off by the fact that it is an exposition exclusively of the Latin

rite, the Prayer Book being left altogether on one side. This will be a pity; for the substance of the book is admirable, and it provides just the sort of thing that we most need. It takes us clean away from the liberalizing corruptions of Christianity, which are everywhere around us, into the heart of the Christian Mystery. One cannot but suspect that, for all his avowed preference for the Counter-Reformation, the author really hopes to reach the many Anglican clergy who, while recognizing that the Prayer Book rite alone has for us canonical authority, regard the Latin rite as (for us) the best of commentaries upon it. If only something to this effect could have been said in the Preface, the book might have achieved much. So, again, it can hardly be of much use to the laity; for if they are to learn to "pray with the Church," as this book seeks to lead them to do, this can only be through the medium of the Anglican rite. With this limitation of outlook goes a certain exclusivist and sectarian tone; and this again is a pity. A book so orthodox (in the true sense) and so well written has a mission to fulfil; but it can only fulfil it by shewing, not that the Mystery of the Mass is the exclusive preserve of the people called Catholics, but that it is the true "fulfilment" of all religion that can rightly be called Christian.

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS. General Editors: K. and S. Lake. London: Christophers.

No. 1. The *Excerpta ex Theodoto* of Clement of Alexandria. Edited with translation, introduction, and notes, by R. P. Casey, Ph.D. Pp. 164. 6″×9¼″. 17s. 6d.

No. 2. St. Epiphanius: *De Gemmis*. Edited by R. P. Blake, Ph.D., and H. de Vis. Pp. cxxiii+335+51. 6″×9¼″. £2. (Or both vols. by subscription, £2 10s. per annum.)

The appearance of a new series which may replace the now closed *Harvard Theological Studies* is something of an event, and a welcome one.

Dr. Casey edits an appendix to the *Stromata* consisting of extracts made by Clement from the writings of Theodotus and at least one other unnamed Valentinian (Gnostic) author, together with rough comments and criticisms by Clement himself. The whole forms what the editor rightly calls "an almost unique survival from antiquity of an author's notebook," and it is the most revealing document extant on the Valentinian system. Dr. Casey's introduction contains a useful discussion of Clement's sources in the *excerpta*, which, if it does not entirely clear up all the problems, at least disposes of most of the quotations from Pantænus alleged by Bousset. The text here printed reproduces that of the unique Laurentian MS. more faithfully than does Stählin's over-edited text in the Berlin *corpus*, and a double apparatus of accepted and rejected emendations by various editors enables the reader to control matters for himself.

The translation is generally excellent, but I note that *νοῦς, νοητός κτλ.* are rendered by "mind," "intellectual," etc. I venture to suggest that for the Valentinians *νοῦς* and its cognates represent *intelligentia* rather than *intellectus*—"intuition," the direct apprehension of spiritual reality, rather than what we understand by "intellectual" processes. There are passages in Plotinus, also an Alexandrian, in which *νοητός* and

νοητικός must be rendered as "spiritual," and I observe that the βάπτισμα νοητόν of *Exc.* lxxxi. 2 reappears as a λύτρωσις πνευματική in the parallel passage *ap.* St. Irenæus, *Adv. Haer.* i. 21, 2. It is a point of some importance for appreciating the quality of the Valentinian "Gnosis."

In *Exc.* lxxxv. 1: "Before baptism let there be νηστεῖαι, δεήσεις, εὐχαί, χειρῶν γονυκλισίαι," a word has fallen out of the MS. before χειρῶν. Casey accepts Ruben's suggestion ἐπάρσεις, but the context and the analogy with Hippolytus strongly suggest ἐπιθέσεις, with a reference to the pre-baptismal exorcisms. Gnostic and Catholic rites have close affinities in the second century.

It is not possible in a brief notice even to indicate the important problems concerning every aspect of the second-century Church raised by the references and parallels adduced in Dr. Casey's concise and very suggestive "Commentary." But their number and range are such as to make this the most valuable part of the edition.

In No. 2 Dr. Blake presents, most of it for the first time, an almost complete text of a tract on the jewels of the High Priest's breastplate from the pen of that erratic and truculent pundit St. Epiphanius of Salamis. This has hitherto been known only in two very inadequate Greek epitomes, and a longer though still curtailed Latin version. Dr. Blake's new text is a Georgian version of a lost Armenian version of a lost Syriac version of the lost Greek original. Though it is thus somewhat remote from the fountain-head the Georgian has the advantage of being complete save for three lacunæ, the largest of which can fortunately be filled from the Latin. Dr. Blake also prints two hitherto unknown Armenian epitomes (which are of little help for the recovery of the original) and promises further Armenian material to come. The Abbé de Vis edits a number of fragments of a Sahidic version of the same tract.

With the aid of these miscellaneous remnants and the all but continuous Georgian, it is possible (though not always easy) to make out most of the substance of the original. But some scope is left for conjecture in places by the curious divergence of the various versions among themselves. Epiphanius' style at its best is incoherent and obscure, and the translators seem at times to have had difficulty in catching his meaning, and to have arrived at different conclusions.

This edition has evidently given an infinity of trouble and forms in itself a beautiful monument of patient and zealous scholarship. In the total absence of a Georgian fount from every press in the U.S.A., Dr. Blake has reproduced the Georgian text and *index verborum* by the laborious process of lithography from sheets prepared by himself with specially cut Georgian types affixed to an ordinary typewriter. M. de Vis' Coptic fragments, all leaves from a single MS., have had to be hunted out in five different libraries among which they are now divided. Some may doubt whether *De Gemmis* is intrinsically worth such labour. Even to the inexpert its mineralogical information must appear gratuitously misleading, though much of it was derived by the author from the lapidaries then current. But some of the statements have the authentically Epiphanian ring of wildness—*e.g.*, that the tuft on the tails of Egyptian wild cows emits a green-coloured light (p. 147). There are some interesting irrelevancies about the Samaritans and their alphabet (pp. 185 *seq.*) and a mention (? the earliest) of Christian missions in Abyssinia (p. 132). Epiphanius also makes some use of otherwise unknown apocrypha, one of them a gospel (pp. 162 *seq.*).

The new series has made an auspicious start. Scholars will look forward with interest to the succeeding volumes, and especially to the edition by C. H. Kraeling of Cumont's Doura fragment of the *Diatessaron*, which is announced as in the press.

GREGORY DIX, O.S.B.

THE FOURTH RIVER AND OTHER SERMONS. By Kenneth E. Kirk, D.D. Skeffington. 3s. 6d.

THIS HOLY FELLOWSHIP. Thoughts on the Holy Communion. By Peter Green. Longmans. 3s. 6d.

Professor Kirk describes these fifteen sermons as sermons *from*, in contrast to sermons *on*, the Bible. In an introduction he draws out the distinction which he has in mind; but perhaps, like many such classifications, it is not altogether convincing. Here it may be sufficient to say that these are not what are commonly called "teaching" nor evangelistic, but (in the best sense of the word) moralizing, sermons. They are characterized by that psychological insight and ethical discrimination which we expect from their author. A French writer has remarked, with a touch of cynicism: "Un prédicateur peut tirer d'un texte obscur toutes les beautés que son esprit et son zèle lui suggèrent." The reader of these sermons will miss their point if he is concerned to distinguish what the preacher reads into the Bible from what is actually there.

For thirty-five years Canon Peter Green has held a monthly class to help his younger communicants to prepare for their communions. *This Holy Fellowship* is based on the talks which he has given at these classes. It is full of good things, suggestive thoughts and striking illustrations, and can be recommended to priests who are in the habit of conducting services of preparation for Holy Communion. It is also a book that may be usefully given to those who at the time of their Confirmation were inadequately instructed in the meaning of the Eucharist. And again, it will be found valuable for devotional reading and meditation.

A. R. VIDLER.

LIFE OF ST. DOMINIC. By Bede Jarrett, O.P. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 3s. 6d.

We welcome this second edition of Fr. Bede Jarrett's life of his Patron, first published ten years ago. He shews us the great founder of the Dominican Order as a boy, just a little solemn and rather sensitive, conscious of his vocation, and knowing his own mind. We see him as a young student, disliking the games of his companions, living a poor and hard life, and having but one extravagance, his books. But even these treasured possessions he sold, that he might have money to give in charity. We are shewn the preacher, arguing, writing, discussing and disputing in public, convinced and convincing that it was in the Catholic Faith that the true answer to the many questions and perplexities that were springing up in men's minds was to be found. We see him at his devotions, conversing with his Divine Friend, praying often vocally and with gestures, sometimes smiling, sometimes weeping, occasionally pausing as though listening to the voice of Another. We see him as death approached,

indomitable to the end, directing every detail, and at last giving the sign for the prayers for the dying to be begun. This is a delightful book—scholarly yet popular. In it, says Fr. Bernard Delany, the author "reveals his own ideals and gives us unconsciously a portrait of himself."

H. S. Box.

THE HAND THAT DROVE THE NAILS. By J. Fletcher Ray. Skeffington. 7s. 6d.

Books or plays dealing with the lives of historical personages, in which fiction is presented as fact, are always in questionable taste, and the book under review, though sympathetically and reverently written, is no exception. The writer is definitely out to establish the divinity of Christ, together with the dogmas of the virgin birth and the empty tomb, but considering the imaginary sources of his information it is very doubtful whether a sceptic would be convinced. The main part of the book is concerned with the experiences of Scipio Martialis, the Roman soldier who nailed Christ to the cross, and who afterwards in remorse and recompense cut off, on the stump of the tree from whence the cross had been hewn, the hand that had offended.

These experiences, including first-hand evidence from the midwife who attended Mary, from Pontius Pilate, Joseph of Arimathea, and others, Scipio wrote down on parchments which, with the three nails of the cross and the severed hand, were preserved intact in a casket until, so the author claims, they fell into his hands during the war.

Mr. Ray says in his introduction that in translating the documents he has kept as nearly as possible to the English of the Authorized Version of the Bible. That may be so, but the book as a whole is far more akin to the apocryphal Gospels than the canonical ones, and the preciousness of its style makes it rather irritating reading.

MARGUERITE HOWSE.

ELISHEVA: STORIES AND POEMS FROM THE HEBREW. Prose rendering by S. H. Lubner. Poetical rendering by L. V. Snowman. With a foreword by Leon Simon. M. L. Cailingold. 3s.

The writer of these stories and poems is the daughter of a Russian father, an English mother, and a convert to the Hebrew faith. Her knowledge of Russian, English, German, and Yiddish has given her insight into the lives and aspirations of many peoples, and an ever-growing desire to identify herself with the ancient race has been the dominant influence in her life from an early age.

Her wide sympathies, mystical penetration, and yearning love for the faith of her adoption are all revealed in this collection of her works. Of the stories, perhaps "Sabbath Lights" and "Queen of the Jews" are the most appealing, the latter, with its portrayal of adolescent dreams and ideals frustrated by contact with stern realities, being especially true to life.

The poems are tender, tragic, and whimsical in quality:

"O wind thou art deceiving me,
Restore thou unto me my rest;
Take thou, O take away from me
Love's burden in my breast."

And yet:

"I slept and heard no sound,
The house was silent too;
And the crystal stars blessed me
With peace of sabbath eve."

MARGUERITE HOWSE.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE MODERN CHAOS. By Wm. Geo. Peck. S.P.C.K. 3s.

THE BOURGEOIS MIND. By Nicholas Berdyaev. Sheed and Ward. 3s. 6d.

These two books deal with a common theme, the revolt from secularism. What Mr. Peck means by secularism is very much what Berdyaev castigates as the "Bourgeois Mind," the idolatry of the visible and the practical dethronement of the supernatural.

Berdyaev is a prophet, and his essays in this little book, especially that on "Man and the Machine," promise a philosophy of Christianity in the new age of technical supremacy which knows nothing of "ends" but is concerned exclusively with means. That promise is not entirely fulfilled, and readers will have an uneasy consciousness that the fire of the prophet disables the author from offering a clearly-stated philosophy. Especially is this the case in the opening essay, which arbitrarily creates a "bourgeois mind" and endows it with every discreditable quality, and then proceeds to denounce it. The obsession that Humanism is the enemy vitiates the whole argument. Liberalism and "middle-classness" can have no virtue. But is this true? It is probable that the Apostles were hopelessly "middle-class" instead of being the picturesque peasants of Renan's picture. They provided the finest material for the Kingdom, as Canon Scott Holland used to point out in reply to the taunt that socialism would create a universal "middle-class" civilization. Berdyaev is a penetrating writer, and sees clearly that Communism may be revolutionary yet thoroughly bourgeois in spirit. "The Tower of Babel was built by the bourgeois: the spirit of socialism is middle-class."

Mr. Peck's lectures are eminently readable, if perhaps a shade too "slick." He sees in secularism or materialism the final menace to society, and argues for the necessity of Catholicism from the present perilous condition of the Western world. It is a legitimate application of our Lord's sayings about salt and leaven. But the reader must beware of the easy argument that "the world has lost God, therefore the world is bankrupt. Restore Religion and you will regain order and happiness." That is not quite what Mr. Peck means, but it is the inference that may be drawn from his chapter on "The Church and the New Society." This is a book addressed originally to preachers, and they will be well advised to take to heart the author's words: "It simply will not do to preach to individuals only about the inner problems of their own personal life, because for the intelligent modern man those problems have become inextricably entangled with the whole problem of civilization."

M. DONAVAN.

ABIDING PRESENCE OF THE HOLY GHOST. By Bede Jarrett, O.P. Catholic Press, N.Y. 2s. 6d.

The reputation of Fr. Bede Jarrett as a teacher will lose nothing by this slender volume. It answers the need of many thousands who either have no time, inclination, or training, to allow them to read with concentrated attention the larger works of Theology. Yet their need to know the truth remains great. In this little book Fr. Bede Jarrett places the teaching of the Church in the hands of any who want to know it. Behind its brevity lies the sure touch of the theologian, who draws out of his treasury just what his reader wants to know. The language is clear and easy, the thought directly expressed; there can be no confusion as to what is meant. Even those who do not belong to his communion will be grateful for his teaching. It bears gracious witness to the fact that, if there are reasons for division, we have a common heritage of great dimensions.

W. E. L.

THE REVELATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. By E. L. Strong. S.P.C.K. 6s.

This book consists of lectures given to the Sisters of the O.M.S.E. and they are published as they were delivered.

Anything which Fr. Strong writes is warm with the spirit of love and prayer and reminiscent of the sights and sounds of India. The exposition of the relevant passages in Old and New Testaments follows closely that of Humphries and Swete. St. John xiv-xvi are recognized as containing the most mature New Testament thought about the Holy Spirit, but this section of the book is rambling and diffuse and does not concentrate sufficiently on the crucial passages.

The chapters on the High-Priestly prayer and the Doctrine of the Trinity are not directly relevant to the main theme, and we should have welcomed in their place fuller treatment of the relation between the Ascended Christ and the Holy Spirit, the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit and the Sacraments.

E. R. MORGAN.

FIVE CENTURIES OF CATHOLIC WITNESS. By F. D. Vaughan. S.P.C.K. 5s.

The aim of the writer is to make clear the essential unity and vitality of the Faith as it is interpreted in the life and thought of representative Fathers of the Church, from St. Clement of Rome to St. Gregory the Great. He has succeeded in fulfilling this aim by a simple and readable recital of the salient facts.

The book demonstrates what a mine of interesting material for sermons and addresses is available in the patristic literature.

E. R. MORGAN.

MODERN THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY. Vol. I. By R. D. Phillips, D.D. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 9s.

This work is the presentation of a simple explanation of the system of philosophy originated by St. Thomas Aquinas and developed by his successors in modern times. The volume before us consists of two parts,

the philosophy of inanimate nature and that of animate nature, and covers ground which has not hitherto been covered in many books in English. While there are several works on Scholastic Ethics available for English readers, Scholastic Cosmology is treated of in very few. When the present reviewer was working a short time ago on the subjects of Space and Time in the Scholastic philosophy, he came to realize how little there was accessible in English.

Dr. Phillips compares modern systems of thought which diverge from the Thomistic with the latter, and so brings into higher relief its positive teaching. The book is therefore quite up-to-date. Many of the questions that were most to the fore in Aquinas' time are not so prominent to-day, and many of those that are most discussed now were hardly in evidence at all then, so that the method of a present-day exposition of Thomism must be different from that of older treatments, although the essential principles must remain the same. This is recognized by all Neo-Scholastic writers.

We commend this treatise to those who would like to have, contained in a single work, a lucid explanation of the various aspects of Thomism. We shall look forward to the appearance of the second volume of the work in question.

H. S. Box.

BOOK NOTES

The Visitor. By H. A. Studdert Kennèdy. Putnam. 2s. 6d. It is good to see the name again. The book is beautifully written, somewhat on the lines of *The Passing of the Third Floor Back*. *The Visitor* has an answer to each of the main perplexities of life.

The Vital Years. By R. J. Halcomb. Warren. 3s. 6d. A plea for fuller co-operation between the Home and the Preparatory School.

Jesus for Every Child. By R. Gladstone Griffith. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. The author holds that "there is no difference between God the Father in heaven and Jesus Christ on earth, except that Jesus, being born a humble peasant in Nazareth, had to live as the rest of us do." The positive teaching is clear and good. The opening chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke are legendary additions, Mr. Griffiths holds; we must choose between them and St. Mark.

The District Visitor. By Helen M. Cobbold. S.P.C.K. 2s. 6d. Aptly described as "A Practical Guide for the Unexperienced," orderly in its arrangement and therefore easy for reference, we have here the fruits of over thirty years' experience. Written primarily for women, it can, nevertheless, be strongly recommended to the junior clergy. But no District Visitor or regular Parish Worker can afford to be without it. We heartily recommend this eminently sensible and practical little book.

H. S. M.

The Royal Way. By O. Bennett, C.P. Washbourne and Bogan. 3s. 6d. Reflections on the Stations of the Cross.

St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland. By Evin MacNeill. Sheed and Ward. 3s. 6d. An acknowledged authority bases a short Life on the Confession

and the Epistle, disregarding the later legends. The printing is uneven. See, for example, the first line on p. 62 and the third on p. 69, where all the words run into one another without spacing.

Think on These Things. By M. O. Blakelock. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. Very short readings on the Epistles for each week of the year.

Fatherhood and Brotherhood. By Phillis Debenham. Elliott Stock. 3s. 6d. Readings based on the Epistle or Gospel for the week.

Fine Linen for Purple. By A. G. Paisley. T. and T. Clark. 5s. Studies on aspects of the Passion of Christ.

Ten Minutes Sermons. By D. C. Tibbenham. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. Topical Sunday morning addresses; described by the publisher as "frank and fearless."

This Latter House. By H. E. Worlledge. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. Deals with the Church of England and her parties in a fresh and interesting way.

Christ and the Afflicted (Skeffington, 2s. 6d.) and *Echoes from Calvary* (S.P.C.K., 2s. 6d.) are both by the Rev. A. Thomas. They contain addresses for Lent and the Three Hours respectively.

Forty Readings for Lent (by E. L. Macassey, Skeffington, 2s. 6d.) will help some readers. *That Good Part* (by F. I. Harrison, Mowbray, 3s. 6d.) contains more solid food and can be confidently recommended.

The Dream of the Rood. Edited by Bruce Dickens and A. S. C. Ross. Methuen. 2s. A very careful edition, with full notes and glossary, of this Anglo-Saxon text, the sources of which are the Ruthwell Cross (A.D. 650-750), the Vercelli MS., and the Brussels Cross (preserved in the sacristy of Brussels Cathedral.

Living Faith. By the Rev. Thomas Wright. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 6s. The sub-title is "The Catholic Layman instructed in the Way of Christian Perfection." While there is much that would help any God-seeking Christian, the early chapters on Adam, treated as a historic person, and on Lucifer, treated in rather a Miltonic manner, would probably be a barrier to an instructed Anglican's profiting from the book.

Damnable Opinions. By Llewelyn Powys. Watts. 3s. 6d. A writer who thinks that the decay of dead bodies is sufficient refutation of Christianity need not disturb theologians. Our faith may be suggested very simply by the question: If electrons are immortal, why should not love be? Mr. Powys never gets beyond the crudest rationalism. A pathetic feature of his book is that part of it, presumably the essays attacking the Oxford Movement, are reprinted from a Protestant quarterly, the editor of which apparently was glad to use *tali auxilio*.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER